New ontology. New ontology: being without substance

In modern European philosophy, the problem of being still remains fundamental. While searching for being, philosophy, as before, defends its difference from science, religion, art, revealing a unique and original subject of its research, which cannot be reduced to either knowledge or faith. By dealing with being, philosophy reveals the unique nature of such thinking in which being can be revealed to us. The search for being is a search for roots, by touching which a person can find the strength to understand the meaning of the world around him. These searches constitute the invisible foundation of what man calls science, art, religion, love, the pursuit of happiness, conscience, and duty.

Nikolay Hartman(1882-1950) - founder of critical or new ontology. Unsolvable problems or unknowable remnants of problems constitute the proper subject of metaphysics. Cognition is surrounded by a metaphysical zone of unknowability; this irrationality does not disappear with the development of sciences, in which the eternal problems of metaphysics will always be posed. Philosophical systems come and go, but they all revolve around the same problems. Awareness of problems is knowledge of ignorance. From the point of view of neopositivists, metaphysical problems are the fruit of the incorrect use of language. According to Hartmann, metaphysical problems are created not by thought, but by being.

Hartmann identified four layers of the real world: dead, living, mental and spiritual; and, accordingly, three cuts in the structure of the real world: the first is between the material (physical) and the mental. Previously, it was imprecisely designated by the division between nature and spirit. The great mystery is that the cut passes through a human being without cutting him. This problem reveals the limit of human knowledge.

The second section (below the first) is between living and inanimate nature. The essence of life, self-regulating metabolism is also the limit and mystery of knowledge.

The third cut is between the spiritual and the psychic. Spiritual life is not a set of mental acts, just as it is not a set of pure ideas. Spiritual existence manifests itself in three forms - personal, objective and objectified spirit.

There are clear boundaries between the layers, and sliding transitions between the steps, for example, genera, species, families, classes in organic nature.

B) Ideal existence

The ideal does not depend on thinking, it is not real, but it cannot be identified with the unreal, because the unreal is also the sphere of thought: fantasies, dreams, etc. Thinking itself is one of the processes of the real world. This is existence without reality, because it is without time. Numbers, triangles, values are something completely different from things, events, personalities, situations. The main types of ideal “in-itself” existence: mathematical essences and values; they correspond to the sciences: mathematics, ethics, aesthetics.

The ideal is mistakenly presented as immanent (dwelling within) consciousness. It is often difficult to separate thinking and the subject of thought from each other. This proximity to consciousness is mysterious and cannot be deciphered. The ideal is a paradoxical synthesis: it is unreal and at the same time existing.

The peculiarities of ways of being are beyond human consciousness; they are deeply irrational. There is no natural consciousness, ideal being, there is only secondary consciousness at the stage of highly developed knowledge in science. Ideal being, due to its great generality, is incomplete and therefore lower being. The changing real world is the highest way of being.

Conclusion.

1. In the view of modern psychology, the “psyche,” in the words of C. Jung, or the human psyche does not at all correspond to the idea of the soul that has developed among philosophers, in the public consciousness and in religious teachings over the past two and a half thousand years.

2. In modern society, the dominant view is that a person is a biosocial entity, and the soul and spirituality are declared to be something ephemeral and non-existent. If scientific evidence of the soul does not exist, then spirituality in a person is recognized immediately. A person whose interests do not go beyond the material sphere is alien to high art, altruism and much else that makes him humane. He may have an extremely developed intellect, he may be well-mannered and kind, but inside he is a callous egoist who does not need love, family, or children. There are many such types in modern society. It is no coincidence that the definition of our society as unspiritual is generally accepted. The distinctive features of a spiritual person are the need for knowledge, altruism and high morality, as well as the desire to serve people. Without restoring the population of spiritual people, it is impossible to build a great Russia and successfully fight corruption, crime and solve other grandiose tasks.

3. We are not trying to conclude that there is a soul and a spirit, since this is impossible. In terms of complexity, it approaches the cosmogonic problem of the “Big Bang”, which can neither be simulated nor repeated, but in terms of its ideological and moral consequences, the answer to this question is of utmost importance, since it explains the essence of man and underlies his spirituality, on by which ethics is created.

4. Religious philosophers, seeing the impasse in which Western materialistic civilization has found itself, are working hard to develop the problem of man and ethics. Of course, they fail to reverse existing trends, but the works of many of them influence the worldview of a fairly wide range of intellectuals.

Keywords

NEW ONTOLOGIES / FLAT ONTOLOGIES / TRADITIONAL ARCHITECTURE / COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE / ARCHITECTURE OF VIRTUAL WORLDS / SPECULATIVE ARCHITECTURE/ NEW ONTOLOGIES / FLAT ONTOLOGIES / ARCHITECTURE / COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE / ARCHITECTURE OF VIRTUAL SPACE / SPECULATIVE ARCHITECTURE

annotation scientific article on other social sciences, author of the scientific work - Ksenia S. Mayorova.

The article is devoted to an attempt to trace the relationship between current trends in the humanities (the formation of new ontologies) and modern architectural practices. The author formulates the key differences between the optics of “old” and new ontologies, where new ones are called flat ontologies, who abandoned the part/whole opposition and judgments in the modality of ought. Having examined various types of architecture (iconic, utopian and social), the author discovers that practices 19 and objects that are traditionally classified as architecture are based on the principles of “old ontologies”. They realize the idea of a person as a superobject, standing above all other objects; they are guided by the classical opposition of part and whole, where the end user for whom architectural projects are carried out can be society (as a whole that is greater than its parts, that is, people) or the human individual (as a part that is greater than its whole, that is, society) . Finally, they articulate the opposition between the present and the due, where the latter has an ontological advantage. New ontologies seem inapplicable to architecture in the traditional sense. However, between new ontologies and the architecture can reveal a double relationship. On the one hand, new ontologies offer a description language that allows one to embrace the diversity of practices traditional architecture(the architecture of our cities) and accept their ontological equality. On the other hand, new ontologies make other architectural practices possible ( computer architecture, virtual worlds and speculative architecture), not replacing traditional architecture, but complementary to it.

New Ontologies of Architecture and Architectures of New Ontologies

The aim of this article is to highlight the relationships between contemporary tendencies in the humanities (the new ontologies) and contemporary architectural practices. The author articulates the distinction between the optics of the “old ontologies” and the new ontologies. The ontologies considered to be new ones are flat, free from classical opposition between the whole and the parts and based on modality of possibility, but not obligation. Objects and practices traditionally referred to as architecture appear to be based on the principles of the “old ontologies”. For them human being is an extraordinary object compared to others, the part-to-whole relationships appear to reflect either the superiority of the whole (society) or the superiority of the part (individual), finally, they are aimed at creating an " it has to be this way" picture. The new ontologies seem to be impossible to apply to architecture in its traditional meaning. Nevertheless, a two-fold link between the new ontologies and architecture can be posed. On the one hand, the former offer a new language to describe the variety of traditional architecture and accept that all of directions, styles and buildings are ontologically coordinate. On the other hand, the new ontologies enable some new architectural practices (computer architecture, architecture of virtual space and speculative architecture) which do not substitute for traditional architecture, but accompany it.

Text of scientific work on the topic “New ontologies of architecture and architecture of new ontologies”

Articles. Theory

Ksenia S. Mayorova

National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

New architecture ontologies and architectures of new ontologies

and objects that are traditionally classified as architecture are based on the principles of “old ontologies.” They realize the idea of a person as a superobject, standing above all other objects; they are guided by the classical opposition of part and whole, where the end user for whom architectural projects are carried out can be society (as a whole that is greater than its parts, that is, people) or the human individual (as a part that is greater than its whole, that is, society) . Finally, they articulate the opposition between the present and the due, where the latter has an ontological advantage. New ontologies seem inapplicable to architecture in the traditional sense.

However, a twofold relationship can be found between new ontologies and architecture. On the one hand, new ontologies offer a description language that allows us to embrace the diversity of practices of traditional architecture (the architecture of our cities)

Mayorova Ksenia Sergeevna - Master of Urban Planning, junior researcher at the Higher School of Urbanism named after. A.A. Vysokovsky National Research University Higher School of Economics. Research interests: modern ontologies, urban ontology, studies of urban soundscapes, studies of popular culture. Email: [email protected]

Ksenia Mayorova - MUP, Junior research fellow, Vysokovsky Graduate School of Urbanism, HSE. Research interests: contemporary ontologies, ontology of the city, sound studies, urban soundscape studies, pop-culture studies. Email: [email protected]

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and accept their ontological equality. On the other hand, new ontologies make possible other architectural practices (computer architecture, virtual worlds and speculative architecture), which do not replace traditional architecture, but complement it.

Keywords: new ontologies, flat ontologies, traditional architecture, computer architecture, architecture of virtual worlds, speculative architecture

Ksenia Mayorova. Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia New ontologies of architecture and architectures of new ontologies

either the superiority of the whole (society) or the superiority of the part (individual), finally, they are aimed at creating an "it has to be this way" picture. The new ontologies seem to be impossible to apply to architecture in its traditional meaning. Nevertheless, a two-fold link between the new ontologies and architecture can be posed. On the one hand, the former offer a new language to describe the variety of traditional architecture and accept that all of directions, styles and buildings are ontologically coordinate. On the other hand, the new ontologies enable some new architectural practices (computer architecture, architecture of virtual space and speculative architecture) which do not substitute for traditional architecture, but accompany it.

Keywords: new ontologies, flat ontologies, architecture, computer architecture, architecture of virtual space, speculative architecture

doi: 10.22394/2074-0492-2017-1-19-40

Architecture in the usual sense is the architecture of buildings built by man and intended for man. One can distinguish many aesthetic styles, theoretical approaches and design principles characteristic of different architectural schools and movements, but there is no doubt that they all keep man as their central figure. How, then, can new ontologies be connected with architecture, putting humans on a par with all others?

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objects? Should the architecture of new ontologies adapt our cities to all possible ontologically equal objects?

This article examines some types of architecture we are familiar with and shows in what sense they are architectures of “old ontologies”. Then, following an articulation of the key differences between old and new ontologies, several types of objects and practices are proposed that, in my opinion, exemplify the architecture of the new ontologies. Thus, we will see that with the advent of new ontologies there was no fundamental change that would make the architecture we are familiar with irrelevant. Rather, on the contrary, new ontologies legitimized the ontological equality of multiple architectural approaches and directions, opening up opportunities for new types of architectures.

The term “new ontologies” is used here as a general concept that includes a set of ontological concepts united by several key provisions1. First of all, these ontologies are flat2, since for them all objects, regardless of their scale, age, intellectual development and apparent complexity, are ontologically equivalent. In other words, there is no superobject that stands above all others, there are no ontological hierarchies. Second, these ontologies challenge classical part-whole models by insisting that no object is ontologically either whole or part. The categories of part and whole are the result of using a certain optics for considering the relationships between objects. What appears in one context as a part of a larger whole may, in another context, itself appear to be a whole made up of many parts. Third,

1 This refers to ontological schematism as a strategy for answering the key ontological question: “What is in the true sense of the word?” For example, Vetushinsky identifies four such schematisms: Parmenidean, atomistic, correlationist and flat ontology schematism.

2 The term “flat ontologies” was first introduced by M. DeLanda in the work “Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy”: “... while ontologies based on relationships between general types and individual particular ones are hierarchical, in them each level represents a separate ontological category (organism, species, genus), the approach from the point of view of the interaction of parts and the emergent whole leads to a flat ontology in which there are exclusively unique, single individuals that differ in spatio-temporal terms, but not in ontological status.”

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new ontologies, due to the ontological equality of all objects, refuse to determine which objects are more significant and which are less, and, therefore, judgment in the modality of ought turns out to be irrelevant. The importance of these provisions for architectural theory and practice lies in the fact that they are in almost every way opposite to the “old ontologies” of traditional architecture.

Architectures of “old ontologies” Iconic architecture for humans

Man has been building houses throughout history, so we can consider that the history of architecture as we know it is rooted in ancient construction practices. Over the millennia, architecture has gone through many transformations, and we know that it can focus on a variety of aspects: not only functional (such as constructivism), aesthetic (such as Gothic), but also geometric (such as postmodernism) or psychological (such as , rationalism). In this case, architecture means a facade, a building or a group of buildings that form a single architectural ensemble, executed in a single conceptual framework and general style. Since the architectural unit in this case is a building, that is, a separate object, we will call such architecture object, or iconic (since a symbolic, or iconic, architectural object, according to this understanding of architecture, will embody the essence of architecture to a greater extent than ordinary buildings).

For a long time, the idea of architecture as exclusively iconic prevailed in the European cultural tradition. For many centuries, architects were guided by geometric and aesthetic principles that developed as the ancient architectural canon and were formulated by Vitruvius in “10 books on architecture” [Vitruvius, 1936]. The treatise was intended for professional architects and described many aspects important for architectural practice, from defining the area of professional competence of an architect to technical details. The people were supposed to be the most numerous users of architecture, and therefore the goal of the architect’s activity (who was aware of the synthetic nature of his art) was precisely the creation of objects capable of having an ideological and emotional effect, to make sure that in the eyes of the public “the greatness of the imperial

riya was also increased by the construction of magnificent public buildings” [Ibid., p. 15]. In other words, the task of the architect was to allow people to talk about architecture as facades, free-standing buildings and groups of buildings, made in some semantic unity.

The key feature of iconic architecture was correct proportions, the ratio of “the members of the structure individually and as a whole to achieve proportionality” [Ibid., p. 21]. An ideal worthy of embodiment “in stone” was revealed in man himself: “Just as in the human body eurhythmy is obtained due to the proportionality between the elbow, foot, palm, finger and other parts, so it happens in perfect structures” [Ibid., p. 22]. Even if the comparison with the harmony of the human body in this case is of a metaphorical nature, the deliberate emphasis on designing buildings “in the image and likeness” of man allows us to say that iconic architecture was built not just by man and for man, but also in accordance with man as the measure of all things .

Today, knowing that other interpretations of the purpose and essence of architecture are possible, we will rather talk about iconic architecture in a critical manner, for example, in terms of infill development. And having learned about the analogies that Vitruvius was guided by, instructing architects for many centuries to come, let us start a song about the futility of anthropocentrism that has already set the teeth on edge. However, alternatives to this type of architecture have become possible relatively recently. The authority of the Vitruvian canon was undermined only in the 18th century by the first results of archaeological expeditions, which showed that ancient architecture was not the only possible one. There are other peoples who, observing the proportions of the human body every day, came to other architectural solutions.

Utopian architecture for the new man

The 20th century in the history of architecture can be called a century of experiments provoked by geopolitical and subsequent social upheavals. Humanity boldly looked into the future, was charged with the wind of change and hoped for the imminent advent of a new type of state, a new type of society, and finally, a new type of person. The leaders of the 20th century, each in their own way, learned the wisdom that “it is not the consciousness of people that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness” [Marx, 1959, p. 7], and often the first thing they did, hoping to create a new society with a new person, was to declare an art

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architectural competition. Due to socio-economic reasons, it was the Soviet Union that became the platform on which the so-called “paper” or utopian architecture blossomed in a new way.

“Not on a “blank slate”, as in the classical utopia, but on the chaotic ruins of the past” [Ikonnikov, 2004, p. 289], the architecture of the new state was intended to set new ideological and conceptual horizons, as well as redefine the everyday practices of the townspeople. Paper architecture was different from iconic architecture in almost everything. This does not mean that in the early period of the history of the Soviet Union all architecture was made of paper. Of course, various buildings were designed and built, often designed to solve strictly utilitarian problems (for example, to accommodate the maximum number of citizens in a limited area with minimal financial resources). costs). But the very opportunity to think and practice a completely different architecture opened up many new horizons. In such a context, neither financial limits, nor the problems of providing buildings with the necessary infrastructure, nor the behavioral patterns of potential users, nor ease of use could limit the flight of creative imagination.

In this context, utopian thinking and utopian ideals, constantly being replaced (as soon as the inconsistency of some promises was revealed, they were replaced by others), were used as a convenient tool for manipulating the masses: “The utopia being created relegated the implementation of the ideal to still invisible distances, while those actually being formed power structures acquired an authoritarian character” [Ibid., p. 291]. Moreover, at first, the projects that we today tend to call utopian seemed quite feasible, and the gap between the mode of physical, actual existence in the present and the mode of staying in the desired ideals of the future world order was revealed only with time. Architecture is not only an extremely effective tool for visualizing a utopian plan, but also a unique way to think about utopia and even fit it into the current state of affairs. “Architectural utopias were correlated with virtual reality, in which what objectively existed was subordinated to speculatively constructed goals” [Ibid., p. 284]. However, perhaps the most interesting thing about utopian projects is not that architecture can create a new man, but that it itself must be created by a new man.

Nikolai Ladovsky, one of the most interesting architects of the 1920s, devoted himself to the cultivation of a new type of architects.

1930s, founder of architectural rationalism. The goal of architectural rationalism projects is “saving mental energy when perceiving the spatial and functional properties of a structure” [Ladovsky, 1926, p. 3]. Even compared to his contemporaries, Ladovsky was particularly progressive in architectural projects and pedagogy. He built his education “the other way around”: not from the study of historical precedents and the aspects of architectural styles implemented in them, but from the formation of thinking mechanisms using logical models. Feeling reverence for the latest achievements of science, Ladovsky combined in his methodology, on the one hand, the study of objective psychophysiological patterns of user perception of space, and on the other, technologically mediated ways of developing the professional competencies of a new type of architect.

In the psychotechnical laboratory created at VKHUTEMAS in 1927, various equipment was used, designed to “help in the selection of applicants to the Faculty of Architecture of VKHUTEIN, as well as to help teachers develop in students those professionally necessary abilities that are poorly developed in them” [Khan- Magomedov, 2007, p. 62]. The eye gauge was considered the key tool through which a new type of architect should carry out his professional activities, and numerous intricate devices were used for its diagnosis and development1. Thus, Ladovsky’s psychotechnical laboratory, being largely involved in the utopian projects of the period of paper architecture, was a laboratory for algorithmization, programming or, if you like, computerization2 of the architects of the future. Architects whose task is to create new spaces of life designed to form a new person.

1 Ladovsky developed and used tools such as a liglazometer - a tool for diagnosing and developing an eye meter for linear quantities, a ploglazometer for improving the architect’s direct work with planar quantities, an oglazometer - respectively focused on determining volume values, and an angle meter designed to determine and develop the architect’s ability to determine corner.

2 Literally, a computer is a calculator. Therefore, in my opinion, it would be appropriate to say that Ladovsky set himself the task of raising a generation of architects who would function as computing machines, or computers.

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Social architecture for society

The third type of architecture focuses on the social dimension of the space created by the architect. For her, what is important is not only and not so much what is located in the immediate vicinity of a person (and even rather literally belongs to him personally), but rather the territories and objects shared by a person with others. The key guideline when creating such architecture is the interaction modes of citizens, that is, it is intended for a complex subject, a society, the numerous parts of which are individual people. This is how architecture articulates its relationship with town planning and urbanism. It is not surprising that many outstanding urban concepts were created by representatives of architectural, and not any other specialties.

Human interest in the forms of social self-organization of animals has become especially significant for the history of social architecture. Aristotle already paid close attention to bees; with his treatise “The History of Animals” one can begin the countdown of 2g sciences about the social and psychological characteristics of animal behavior, which will fully enter the arena only towards the end of the 19th century1. It was then that visual images of architectural structures of social animals began to be explicitly used in iconic architecture. In the 80s of the 19th century, Gaudí embodied his famous architectural solution: the parabolic arch, a design whose idea can be found in the external shape of a honeycomb. Later, in the first half of the 20th century, Mies van der Rohe actively used a hexagonal mesh, reminiscent of another structural feature of bees - the internal structure of honeycombs. Beekeeping also introduced anthropogenic forms of organizing the life activity of bees into architecture, for example, in the “House-Ino” project by Le Corbusier, which belongs more to the social type of architecture than to the iconic one.

1 For the history of the introduction of beekeeping metaphors into architecture, see. Ramirez sees the origin of interest in bees and the structure of their life in Aristotle. However, it should be recognized that Aristotle is rather interested in the usefulness of animals and their waste products when consumed by humans as food or as medicine. In addition, the analogy with the structure of everyday practices among bees made it possible to justify relations of dominance and subordination in human societies.

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The idea of similarity of the structure of human living space to the life of social animals, whose activity became a symbol of labor and cooperation, in the context of leftist sentiments of the first half of the 20th century turned out to be more than appropriate. Mies van der Rohe and Le Corbusier, as well as many other prominent architects of the time, developed architectural modernism, a style that on the one hand has strong aesthetic principles (like iconic architecture), on the other hand, intended for the new man of a new era (like architectural utopia ), but at the same time designed to solve many utilitarian problems that arise in the context of the reorganization of the life of citizens in connection with urbanization and large-scale construction of apartment buildings in old and newly created cities throughout Europe.

The utopian component often turned out to be dominant in modern1 architecture, and this led to its collapse. Too much faith in the potential influence of architecture on the way of life and interaction of people often pushed people to take too bold steps and resulted in miscalculations, due to which the space of modernist architecture became uninhabitable. The death of modernism (both as an architectural style 27 and as a conceptual principle in architecture) has a specific date: July 1972, when the Pruitt-Igoe social housing complex was blown up by decision of the US Federal Government.

Opened in 1956 in St. Louis, Missouri, Pruitt-Igoe seemed to embody the best principles of modernist architecture: separate apartments for many thousands of residents, landscaping and recreational areas, infrastructure for young families with children. However, the social order was disrupted; the entire more or less prosperous population, experiencing psychological discomfort from living there, left the complex. Pruitt-Igoe turned into a poverty-stricken ghetto: the infrastructure systematically suffered from vandalism, the crime rate reached monstrous levels, and residents

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When speaking about architectural modernism (and then postmodernism), I mean not so much architectural styles as a conceptual framework. Thus, modernism is a social architecture built on the basis of society as a subject, while postmodernism is a social architecture built on the basis of the individual as a subject.

Katerina Bristol offers a completely different interpretation of the events in Pruitt-Igoe. See her article “The Myth of Pruitt-Igoe” in Sociology of Power, 2014, no. 2.

found themselves unable to pay their bills, leading to the collapse of the housing infrastructure.

“If a new paradigm arises in thinking or in any field, for example in architecture, it is obviously the consequence of a major cultural shift, a change in worldview, religion, probably politics and most certainly in science.” The crisis in architecture was a manifestation of a more complex crisis in Western culture that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At this time, the close interpenetration of various scientific disciplines is intensifying. Thus, from the exact and natural sciences to the field of architecture and urban planning comes the concept of complexity, fashionable at that time. Technology played a major role, as in all times: new generations of computers and computerization of production made geometrically complex buildings (like the objects designed by Frank Gehry) accessible: their cost became comparable to the cost of modernist concrete boxes. The era of postmodernism nurtured essentially modernist ideals with a slight difference. If for modernism the subject for which architectural activity is carried out was the existing society with all its socio-cultural and economic-political features, then for postmodernism the subject becomes a person, an individual as a representative of this society and a bearer of the characteristics characteristic of the latter1.

The above brief description of the three types of architecture is not a classification; it does not pretend to strictly divide all existing types of architecture into three classes. It is rather intended to reveal some bright accents that we can find in the history of world architecture. In the case of iconic architecture, the subject (architect/person) defines the object (architectural structure) in his own image and likeness. Within the framework of utopian architecture, the object (architectural structure/designed space) sets the subject, while the architect understands that in order to create a fundamentally new

1 In the theory of architecture, postmodernism is discussed at length and in detail; at least three understandings of architectural postmodernism are highlighted: as a historical period, particularly associated with the period of modernism; as a set of significant paradigms (theoretical frameworks) for considering cultural problems and objects; and as a set of specific topics. In my schematization we are not talking about an architectural style, but about a conceptual framework, and therefore postmodernism appears as a pluralistic, updated, revised version of modernism “with a human face.”

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object, a fundamentally new subject is needed, and therefore the pedagogical component begins to play a large role. For social architecture, the subject becomes collective and can be considered either as a whole that is greater than its parts (modernism), or as individual parts greater than the whole they form (postmodernism).

In the architecture of each of the described types, certain postulates of classical or old ontologies are explicitly or implicitly reproduced. Thus, the architectures described above are anthropocentric in the sense that they are created by man and exclusively for man. The extraordinary ontological place of man is especially clearly visible in the example of Vitruvian iconic architecture. Social architecture is indicative for understanding classical ideas about the ontological relationship between the whole and its parts. A person is inevitably a part of society, being either a replaceable and programmable element (which has no meaning in itself, but acquires it as a whole), or a unique embodiment of society, without which the latter is impossible (and then the truly significant subject becomes not society, but, on the contrary, an individual). 29 Using the example of utopian architecture placed on the rails of totalitarianism, one can see how the architectures of old ontologies managed - and still manage to this day - to reproduce the opposition between the present and the due, where the latter has an obvious ontological advantage.

New architecture ontologies

The first thing that new or flat ontologies do with architecture is to allow it to be multiple: instead of one architecture, we can now talk about different architectures. In this sense, the description of different types of architectures of old ontologies given in the previous section is flat. On the other hand, in the language of new ontologies we can talk about architecture in the singular, in which case architecture turns out to be a complex object: these are facades, and the physical frame of the building, and the organization of adjacent space, and two-dimensional drawings, and utopian dreams of creating ideal cities with all the illustrative visualizations, and many other things and processes. No reductionist description that defines architecture as an entity can be considered correct in such a context.

The new ontologies dealt the greatest blow to anthropocentrism. As we saw above, the architectures of old ontologies have

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They are anthropocentric simply because they are created by man and for man (even if this is a new man created by utopian architecture). Does the accession of new ontologies to the philosophical throne mean that from now on architecture will not be created for or by man? The second is quite likely, and often today computers and architectural programs take on most of the architect's work. But architecture for human society - that is, the architecture of modernism (for which society is more important than the individual) and postmodernism (for which the individual is more important than society) - is not going anywhere. And this does not indicate the inconsistency of new ontologies, but, on the contrary, follows from the postulate of flatness. The architecture characteristic of modern cities has the right to exist to the same extent as other architectures have the right to exist.

Often, confusion when discussing the logical sequence of new ontologies arises due to the confusion of the ontic and ontological levels of consideration. By affirming the ontological one-order nature of objects, new ontologies do not at all pretend to assert their ontic one-order nature.

30 In the case of architecture, this is especially important, since it allows us to see that holding a person as an urban superobject (object par excellence) does not at all mean that the language of new ontologies is applied inconsistently. And, conversely, the ontological equality of a person and any other objects does not entail ontic equality, that is, it does not mean, for example, that instead of the hygienic parameters that must be observed to maintain the physical and mental health of a person, the construction of buildings in Moscow will be guided by the parameters of well-being white whales or Newton's binomial. Cities were created by man and continue to exist for man. But immediately after this clarification, new ontologies clarify that other worlds are possible - and ontologically of the same order as ours - where other cities are possible, in which everything can be different.

Associated with the difference between the ontic and ontological levels is the redefinition of the relationship between the part and the whole, undertaken by new ontologies. In the “old ontologies” this relationship could be understood in two ways: the whole is ontologically greater than its parts, the whole is what determines the parts (we saw this in architectural modernism, which was aimed at creating the whole - society - through influencing the parts - individual people) ; and, conversely, the parts are greater than the whole they constitute, in the sense that the whole is determined by its parts (we saw this in postmodernism, in which the homogeneity of the whole is

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is blematized, and therefore one can only work with the pluralism of human cultures and individuals).

New ontologies accept the relevance of this kind of models of relationships between the part and the whole, but only at the ontic level. At the level of describing interactions with objects, we need operational micro-hierarchies and allow discursive asymmetries simply because we are always forced to reason and act from a human perspective. But at the ontological level, when we are faced with “not an epistemological question about how we know objects, but a question about what an object is” [Bryant, 2014, p. 280], the very distinction between part and whole does not make any sense, since objects that can, in a certain ontic situation, appear as a whole and its parts (for example, a city and a street, a street and a building) are ontologically equivalent individuals1. “All things exist equally, although they exist differently.”

Architectures of new ontologies

Computer architecture 31

Today, the term “architecture” is often used in areas very far from urban planning: in various technical areas, for example, when talking about the architecture of computer platforms or software architecture. In this case, the word “architecture” is used exclusively metaphorically as a synonym for the structure of an object. However, from the point of view of new ontologies, today we have many varieties of architecture, and all of them, despite the fact that they do not always directly deal with the design of buildings, are nevertheless architecture in the same sense as iconic, utopian and social. architecture.

A computer has its own architecture and its own design. If in the case of a building its architecture is rather its external side, and its design is internal, for example, the design of interiors or individual objects inside the building, then in the case of a computer everything is exactly the opposite. The case, the outer shell of the computer, is an example of product design, but the architecture of the computer is what is inside. But a natural question arises:

1 Despite the fact that in the description of the theory of assemblages Manuel DeLanda. uses the categories "part" and "whole", I am convinced that his ultimate goal is to clarify the lack of need for these categories.

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What, in fact, allows us to say that the internal structure of a computer is architecture in the full sense of the word?

The history of the computer can be traced back to Leibniz or Pascal, but in this case we would have to admit that up to a certain point the computer was either a mental construct or a small mechanical device, and such a computer had only design, but not architecture. In the context of new ontologies, we are talking about computers, whose history begins in the 40s of the 20th century. Since then, the computer structure has become much more complicated, while the object itself has significantly decreased in size. The spatial dimensions of the first computers, comparable to the area of a small private house, made it possible to literally talk about them in terms of architecture, understood as the organization of space. And the fact that computer architecture has become less and less human over time (less commensurate and less understandable to the average person) does not deprive it of the right to be called architecture in the conceptual framework of flat ontologies.

32 Today we are talking about computer architecture as complex

multi-level structure, the individual elements of which are optimally connected with each other, which ensures the operability of the system1. In addition to the visible elements, as in the architecture of cities we are familiar with, there are many other significant elements in the architecture of a computer. Therefore, it is important to note that the complexity of the internal architecture of a computer is one of the components of an even more complex whole - a computer as a complex object (for example, a PC or a game console), which can be considered at several levels: at the level of reception/operation, interface, form/ functions, code and the platform itself.

Thus, when we talk about computer architecture, we do so not only metaphorically (for example, inspired by the external analogy of the motherboard and a modernist city from a bird's eye view). Ontologically, computer architecture is like this

1 As I already said, mentioning the computers of Pascal and Leibniz, not all objects that can be called computers in different classifications fit the description of the architecture of new ontologies. For example, Tanenbaum and Austin highlight “disposable” computers, that is, “chips that are glued to the inside of greeting cards to play tunes.” I don't take such simple devices into account.

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architecture is the same as the architecture of the city1: its task is to ensure uninterrupted communications, to connect spatially separated areas of the common territory. And the use of the term “architecture” in relation to a computer, due to the complex structure of the latter, rather honors the architecture we are familiar with than blurs its boundaries, as one might think at a first approximation.

Architecture of virtual worlds

Architecture has always existed in close connection with technological developments. The condition for the possibility of certain practices of architectures of new ontologies was the emergence of computer digital graphics. This new medium opened up many new possibilities for architecture, since it “offered a new method of representing three-dimensional reality: both already existing and only imaginary objects.” In other words, we are talking not only about three-dimensional visualizations of the projects of architects of iconic or social architecture, but also about the creation of fundamentally new worlds and architecture, which 33 can be free from the logical and physical laws known to us.

As Novak writes, “Cyberspace offers opportunities to make the most of the separation of data, information, and form, a separation made possible by digital technology. By reducing entities, objects and processes to the same underlying zero representation as binary flows, cyberspace allows us to reveal hitherto invisible relationships." In other words, the improved architecture of the computer as a platform made it possible to create a completely new architecture of virtual worlds.

As we see in the example of three-dimensional video games, virtual worlds can exist according to laws similar to the laws of our world. In particular, to be anthropocentric and take place in a geographical and historical context known to us, for example, in Paris during the French Revolution, as in the computer game Assassin's Creed: Unity (2014). In this case, the architecture of video games will imply architecture in a completely classical understanding: the architect involved in the development of the game, in collaboration with historians, will design buildings, infrastructure

1 Although, as we remember from Bogost’s quote, they exist in different ways.

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tour and public spaces in accordance with chronicles, historical documents and other data about the “original” (“real” city of the past). Also, obviously fictional events can unfold in a detailed reproduction of the architecture of a “real” location, as is often implemented in first-person shooters, for example, in the post-apocalyptic horror Metro 2033 (2010) or the alternative history world of Resistance: Fall of Man (2006).

A model of the city, with clear allusions to the “real” city, can be seen in the 3D games of the Grand Theft Auto series (since 2005). Here the architecture of the prototype cities is reproduced not literally, but with an emphasis on key features of the landscape. But the possibilities of 3D architectural graphics are not limited to such reproduction “close to the original”. Within the framework of this type of architecture of new ontologies, it is possible to create completely different worlds, unlike ours: from Mass Effect (2008) with its obviously fantastic world and human characters, to Journey (2012) with a fantastic world and fantastic characters, and Minecraft (2009) with a completely different type of architectural 34 practice.

In the context of video games, it is important to again draw attention to the fact that flat ontologies deliberately suspend the correlation of the virtual world and its observer/player, which is us or others like us, preferring to study the ontology of the virtual world itself. In a similar way, today we study the structure of our world by “suspending” an imaginary figure of an external correlate (for example, a creator or an observer from space).

Speculative architecture

Various ways of relating architecture and design have been mentioned above, but in some cases it is not possible to distinguish between them. For example, in the popular (but not universally recognized) architectural direction of speculative architecture today, architects are engaged in the conceptual development, design or visualization of various kinds of objects, spaces and concepts. Finding a clear definition of speculative architecture is difficult because it is an open set of heterogeneous practices, but something about the main features of this type of architecture becomes clear to us from the description of speculative design.

Speculative trends in design can be mistaken for futurological fantasy, but today, when created

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With us, computers already significantly surpass human creative abilities, the attempt to predict the future seems insufficiently justified. Speculative design rather uses concepts of possible future worlds in order to better understand our contemporary world [Dunn, Raby, 2017]. At the same time, speculative design is guided by the possibilities of the present, its development potential. In this sense, even visualizations of future landscapes created by speculative designers, which may seem completely fantasy, are designed to reveal the non-obvious possibilities of the present [Ibid]. All these conceptual beliefs are also characteristic of speculative architecture.

In some cases, objects of speculative architecture may look utopian, but there is a difference between utopian architecture and speculative architecture: it lies in the modality in which the architectural project is built. Utopia with the modality of obligation is the architecture of the new man as an example of the architecture of old ontologies. While modern speculative architecture (and the architecture of virtual worlds), made possible by computer technology, is a conceptual space where “it-could-be-this way” takes precedence over “it-should-be-this way.”

Speculative architecture is not something you can see when you go out onto a city street (at least with your own eyes without augmented or virtual reality technologies). Moreover, in most cases, this is not even something that can be fully understood with the help of an architectural album or design documentation. But to what extent today, when digital technologies mediate every step of our daily lives, can architecture be limited to the physical content of the streets and the paper representation of buildings? Speculative architecture uses various media as means of architectural thinking1.

The fact that today architectural thinking can be carried out through motion graphics, interactive art installations and speculative conceptualizations is only demonstrative.

1 Nikolai Ladovsky, the future founder of the psychotechnical laboratory of Vkhutein, thought about the technologies of his time in approximately the same way: he perceived new building materials, in particular reinforced concrete, “not as a means of solving objective problems, but as a source of means of form-building, carrying new symbolic meanings and liberating from the limitations of the traditional language of forms" [Ladovsky, 1926, p. 3.]

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argues that architecture, unlike many less progressive professional fields, uses new technologies for optimization and development. To the extent that the products of speculative architecture are not buildings, but virtual worlds, structures, objects and concepts, and to the extent that not only images are used as a format of expression, but also explicitly narrative products - videos, interactive objects, games - speculative architecture is architecture of storytelling. Instead of making a statement of function (as in social architecture) or making an ideological statement (as in iconic and often utopian architecture), speculative architecture tells a story about a possible future.

As long as cities are built and inhabited by people, the architecture of our cities, no matter how diverse it is and no matter how actively it develops, will remain the architecture of old ontologies. The conceptual focuses of the architectures of old ontologies discussed in the first part of the article were intended to reveal and articulate the ontological principles underlying those types of objects 36 and practices that we are accustomed to attributing to architecture. Thus, these three architectures implement anthropocentric optics, an essentialist way of conceptualizing the relationship between the part and the whole, and also reproduce the asymmetrical opposition between the present and the due. All these principles turn out to be irrelevant in the context of new ontologies.

Nevertheless, it is possible to trace the connection between new ontologies and architecture. First, new ontologies can function as a flat description language with which architecture can be viewed in all its diversity. Thus, thanks to new ontologies, we are able to talk about multiple architectures, each of which may have its own advantages and disadvantages, despite the fact that they all exist equally. Secondly, as a consequence of flat optics, new types of architectural practices become possible that are not directly related to the physical space of the architecture of our cities. The computer architecture, architecture of virtual worlds, and speculative architecture discussed above do not exhaust all the possibilities that have opened up for architects after the emergence of new ontologies. This set seems indicative: we see that the architectures of new ontologies are directly related to new media platforms and their technical capabilities.

EB modeling technologies have made it possible to transfer architectural practice in all its diversity to a virtual environment,

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allowed us to begin to think with possibilities, rather than limitations, and allowed us to use the computing abilities of the machine in the creative process. Now even platforms themselves can act as architectural objects1.

In many ways, precedents for the identified three types of architectures of new ontologies can be found long before the emergence of the latter as an intellectual mainstream. In particular, virtual worlds have been created in works of literature, the history of computer architecture can be traced back to Leibniz or Pascal, and speculation has always been one of the key tools of all architects. However, it is only now that the language of new ontologies that has been formed makes it possible to describe these objects and practices as architectures.

In comparing the architectures of old and new ontologies, the key is their relationship to the physical space of our world. The creative freedom of speculative architects and architects of virtual worlds is associated with the relatively low cost of architectural activity and relatively insignificant costs, while the architecture of old ontologies is inevitably the most expensive form of art, since it is doomed to be based on the exhaustible resources of our planet (building materials and earth). And this may lead one to think that the architecture of new ontologies is completely useless for the architecture of our cities. However, it is not. In it you can see a resource: research, technological, speculative. Moreover, if most of the resources used by the architecture of our cities are irreproducible, then the resources of new ontologies can act as a kind of perpetual motion machine of traditional architecture.

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1 All given schematizations are not classifications. This is just a list of some prominent trends or principles. The history of architecture knows many examples of intermediate types of architecture, for example, parametric, or generative, architecture is a mix of iconic architecture (the architecture of one object) and speculative architecture as architecture created not so much by a person as by a computer algorithm.

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“The thinking of modern times saw the main philosophical science in the theory of knowledge. It was assumed that we know more about knowledge than about its subject; However, they did not notice that knowledge itself is a big mystery, since the relation with which it deals is transcendental, that is, literally “going beyond the limits of consciousness.” For the object of knowledge exists independently of knowledge itself.

The response to this today is anthropology. It turned out that cognition is only one of many connections between consciousness and the outside world. Reaction, action, love and hatred are other, parallel transcendental relations, and, moreover, primary ones, while knowledge is secondary and temporally formed only depending on them. This was seen as an indication of the structure of the human being, and therefore the science of man had to be placed before the theory of knowledge.

But this turned out to be half-hearted. The true understanding of a human being obviously includes knowledge about the existential relationships in which a person finds himself. For man is a creature dependent on a thousand conditions. These existential relations are the completeness of the world. So, it was necessary to understand a person, including his consciousness, based on his embeddedness in the integrity of the real world. Thus, we came to the old problem of ontology, that is, that science that was once pushed aside for the sake of the theory of knowledge and which was eventually completely abandoned.

Thus, today we are faced with the task of creating a new ontology. It is quite clear that after all the successes of science, the old ontology can no longer exist. We are no longer talking about the form and matter of existence. And not about “potency and act”. For it is no longer the target relationship of “substantial forms” that dominates the world, no teleology can help us anymore; neutral “laws” have turned out to be the dominant forces of nature, and the relationship of cause and effect governs world events from below.

The new ontology proceeds from other considerations. She sees “structure” (what is usually called objects) and “processes” not separately, but together.

Everything that really exists is in the process of becoming, it has its origin and destruction; the primary dynamic formations from atoms down to the spiral fog are as much processual as they are articulated (Gliedgeftige) and formed (Gestaltgefuge) formations. To an even greater extent, this occurs in relation to organic formations, starting from consciousness as a mental integrity, and in relation to the orders of human society.

In these formations there is other a method of preservation than substantiality: preservation through internal balance, regulation, amateur recreation or even amateur transformation.

In contrast to substance, it can be called consistency. Its result is, although not eternal, a duration long enough to give formations the property of being a carrier of changing states (accidents). […]

The structure of the real world has the form of layering. Each layer is a whole order of existence. There are four main layers: physical-material, organic-living, spiritual, historical-spiritual. Each of these layers has its own laws and principles. The higher layer of existence is entirely built on the lower one, but is only partially determined by it.

Metaphysics built on one single principle or on one single group of principles (as it has always been constructed before) is therefore impossible. All constructed pictures of the unity of the world are incorrect - both “metaphysics from below” and “metaphysics from above” (based on matter or spirit).

There is a natural system of the world that is not designed. Its structure can be found in phenomena. But it is not reducible either to a single point or centralized unity, or to the root cause or highest goal.

What can be established is the pattern of the structure itself.”

Nikolai Hartman, Old and new ontology, in Sat.: Ontology. Texts of philosophy / Ed.-comp. V.Yu. Kuznetsov, M., “Academic project”; Peace Foundation, 2012, p. 15-16.

In its original understanding, ontology is the doctrine of being, and ontics is the doctrine of existence. Any attempts to say something else - “the science of being” or “theory of being” - are already based on one or another ontology. In modern computer science, ontology is also understood as a detailed formalization of a certain field of knowledge using a conceptual diagram: a hierarchical data structure containing all classes of objects, their connections, transformation rules, theorems.

In a broad sense ontology name the most fundamental ideas in a particular area of thinking and activity being on an equal footing. Ontikoy call fundamental ideas in a particular area of thinking and activity that relate to existing.

Ontologies can be differentiated on different grounds:

Fundamental or metaontologies, which describe the most general concepts that do not depend on either the subject area or any structural ordering;

Environmental ontologies (natural language, music, dance, facial expressions, gesture, etc.);

Formal ontologies, that is, ways of symbolic and/or schematic expression of fundamental concepts associated with corresponding meaningful ontologies;

Regional ontologies, that is, ontologies of subject regions representing one or another area of knowledge (for example, ontologies of physics, chemistry, etc.);

Subject ontologies, which are used to express the objects themselves that have conceptual content (object, subject, activity, social, etc.);

System ontologies (describing the system with respect to connections, processes, functions, morphology, material);

Ontologies of formal ontologization in SMDM (working or nuclear, comprehensive, ultimate);

Ontologies of a specific problem or task, which define the terminological basis of a specific problem or task;

Cognitive ontologies (which distinguish themselves from epistemological ontologies, which deal with knowledge as dealing with fundamental ideas);

Ontologies of pictures of the world (natural (evolution), cultural-human (genesis), mental activity (development), constructive (negentropy));

Accordingly, ontologies are anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric;

Ontologies are dominant and absorbed;

Normative ontologies of TV (structural: object, process, structural-continuum and structural-linguistic: structurization, structuration, propositional, signification);

From the point of view of the complexity of assembly schemes: ontologies are single- and multi-level, single- and multi-factor.

Virtual ontology- a new ontology, where there are new properties: 1) ontological position of construction (virtuality, otherness) and ontological position of interpretation (relevance, evidence); 2) counterreflection as a new type of thinking compares these two positions; 3) in meaningful ontology, ontology is expressed through metasemiosis, and in formal ontologization through construct-semiosis; 4) the otherness of virtuality is associated with new purely speculative ontological concepts - “structural vision”; 5) the basic process of virtual ontology is negentropy, regardless of space-time, and among other ontological pictures of the world - this ontology is not a picture, but a construction of the world.

Network ontology- topological expression of structural-continuum normative virtual ontology.

The main issue of TV is fundamental reontologization as an overcoming of postmodernism based on the pluralism of positional knowledge. TV makes a transition from epistemological understanding And explanations to cognitive understanding through comprehension in fundamental concepts, and ontological justification through ontological positions. Instead of traditional environments and means for philosophy (thinking, speech-text, activity, logic, language, experience), TV offers a new environment of reontologization - semiosis.

Cognitive ontologization is the essence of the expression of the most fundamental concepts: through special concepts in meaningful ontologization and through signs-symbols (symbolization) in formal ontologization. The very approach to what ontological position formal ontology comes from, what we do - describe-interpret or express-construct - is also ontological. In TV we talk about the “expression of ontology” in semiosis.

Ontologies from the point of view of the ontological position of TV are constructive and interpretative; contraflexive And undifferentiated. Since the creators of ontologies always follow one or another goal of understanding for one or another ontologization with an arbitrary unreflective change of ontological positions, then gradually for the creators themselves they receive poorly differentiated ontologies. The strict distinction by the creators of ontologies of ontological positions in one or another ontology creates very different ontologies.

“AV” modeling has an ontological status.“AB” models would not make sense to create if they did not have some additional advantage over concepts, thinking, language, system, ontological symbolization and formalization, pure structuring without structuring, that is, an advantage not only from the point of view of fundamentality, but also heuristic power. The advantage of “AV” models is that, as we have already noted, they allow us to express not only existing knowledge at the ontological level, but also to show such an ontologization of this knowledge, as will be described below, which allows us to outline ways to resolve certain problems and formulate fundamentally new ideas about the world - virtual ideas. “AB” models are TV ontoschemes.

Today we are in a situation where a wealth of theoretical experience has already been accumulated not only in ontologization, but also in the transition from one ontology to another. We decided to summarize this experience in ontoaxiologems, which are the theoretical and value experience of ontologization and reontologization. Ontoaxiology built by us as a description of some approaches inside ontological work, that is, work at the ontology level.

Ontologization- expression of fundamental ideas. We have not one (Quine) but four situations of ontological relativity: 1) the relationship between ontology and ontics; 2) the gap between different ontologies; 3) Interaction of metaontologies; 4) reontologization and fundamental reontologization (fundamentalization).

1) The relationship between ontology and ontics.

The ontology can be indicated or specified negatively or descriptively through a cognitive metaphor. But ontology can only be expressed in a special way. Ontology is expressed in representations, not in concepts or categories. Ontology is more adequately expressed in semiosis rather than in language. The ontology must be independent of ontics and other ontologies due to special means of expression - the principle of independence of ontology from ontics and other ontologies.

Ontologies are expressed in ontologies And ontoschemes. Any ontics presupposes expression by ontologems: 1) in systems axioms- in interpretive theories, in a set principles- in constructive theories; 2) in laws- in immanent theories, in postulates- in conceptual theories.

2) Gap of ontologies is a common situation for different ontologies.

There are such problems in trying to bridge the ontology gap. The first problem is that there is one ontology, there is another, there is a gap between them: how is the position from which fundamentally different ontologies are considered? The second problem is that the gap can be comprehended in the 1st and 2nd ontologies: how can such an ontological gap be overcome, in what ontology or external position. The third problem is that if the gap is bridged, the representation of one ontology about another is positional (1st about the 2nd and 2nd about the 1st): how are representations (and not knowledge) of one ontology about another allowed.

Being in one ontology, it is impossible to understand another. Understanding does not work with ontology. Works with ontology comprehension, which destroys the old and creates a new understanding.

Different methods of ontologization within the same ontology are called normative ontologies. Normative ontologies within the same metaontology are not mutually exclusive.

3) Interaction of metaontologies.

Metaontology express their attitude to the Absolute and have an expression of each other (in each other).

Metaontology can have more than one ontic. Every ontic is connected with its real existence.

Conflicts within metaontologies do not destroy these ontologies. The purposeful destruction of any metaontology by another metaontology is dangerous for all metaontologies.

4) Reontologization and fundamental reontologization (fundamentalization).

All thinkers in the process of thinking and activity are always already in some kind of ontology. Few people understand this. Only a few are capable of performing fundamental reontologization. Ontology changes once in an era by one thinker.

Representation of one ontology into another through ontological transition called reontologization. Reontologization is always problematically adequate, since it is associated with distortion and loss of some ontology content during the transition to another ontology.

The new ontology is not a product of pure imagination. In order for us to admit a new ontology in the imagination, we must at least observe its manifestations in some form.

The assumption of a new ontology is hypothetical until it arises the problem is at the level of fundamental ideas.

Ontology is born in a situation theoretical crisis, which coincides with life crisis a human theorist for whom a new ontology in theory is, among other things, a way out of a life crisis.

When changing ontology, ideas about thinking, understanding, reflection and ontology itself change.

When ontologies change, the ideas of people, carriers of one or another ontology, about their lives always change.

Fundamental reontologization This is a re-ontologization when it is produced using simpler ontological units and more complex schemes for assembling one ontology in relation to another ontology. Nevertheless, fundamental reontologization does not give rise to the expression of one ontology in another that is adequate in itself. Adequacy Fundamental reontologization is a set of specially solved problems and the result of long-term intellectual efforts spent on this.

Fundamental reontologization is a unique (once in an era) case ontological justification. Ontological justification as a task of philosophy was formulated and described by Heidegger: find a medium, approach, method and means for adequate expression of the grounds. However, language as an ontological environment, the comparison of design analytics and design analysis as an approach, pointing “here” as a way of interpreting being and existentials as a means of such pointing in Heidegger are not universal and fundamental once and for all.

The combination of simplicity and universality is the main problem of fundamental reontologization- on the one hand, ontology representations must be as simple as possible in order to be indivisible ontological units and provide simplicity of expression for ontological justification, on the other hand, must be complex enough to provide universal accessibility other ontologies. In TV, this problem is solved through multi-level normalization, where each level is simple, and their configurative relationship is complex.

A more fundamental ontology has simpler ontological units. This quality is called simplicity fundamental ontology.

A more fundamental ontology has more complex assembly diagrams simple ontological units. This quality is called versatility fundamental ontology.

A more fundamental ontology in functionally expresses a wider range of situations.

A theoretical compromise between the old and new ontologies is unacceptable. The conflict of ontologies for fundamentality ends ontological absorption- becomes new dominant and absorbs the old one through her ontological reconstruction on new grounds.

Old ontologies do not die as long as the situations that gave rise to them live. Old ontologies continue to live as absorbed as sources of representations for new ontologies.

Ontology is new until it is “lived in.” The new ontology “takes root”, makes it possible to structure previously unstructured ontological units, create even more complex assembly schemes, and thereby forms the preconditions for the emergence of an even newer ontology.

Knowledge ontologies must be more fundamental than knowledge for knowledge to be adequate. When knowledge begins to be built on more fundamental concepts than all existing ontologies, the need arises for fundamental reontologization and revision of knowledge within the new ontology.

Kantian ontology undergoes reontologization in TV - in technological processes of apperception. Hegelian ontology undergoes re-ontologization in TV metasemiosis. Husserl's ontology is re-ontologized in the construct-semiosis of TV. Relatively Heideggerian ontology TV constructs natural language through linguistic standardization from structural rationing. Structuralist text ontology(“the world as text” by Derrida) is re-ontologized in the basic structure of reality and in linguistic normalization, and Deleuze's network ontology- becomes the basis of a structural-continuum normative ontology. TV has significant differences in relation to SMDM, where the problem of ontology and ontologization was studied in detail.

Firstly, ontological position preceded in TV ontological ideas. There are differences between constructive and interpretative ontological positions.

Secondly, ontologically indivisible structural units (ontological units)- connection, direction, similarity - are further divisible according to their functions in clearly distinguishable rationing levels- in both ontological positions.

Thirdly, the ontological concepts underlying the construction of ontological units are not derived from knowledge, but are obtained in a constructive ontological position from pure conceptual speculation - “structural vision”.

Fourthly, diagrams for assembling ontological units, that is, formal ontologization (in TV - levels of normalization), are not methodological. Assembly schemes are specified twice - in construct semiosis (“AB” model) and in metasemiosis as a taxonomy dependent on construct semiosis.

Fifthly, ontological representations form not an ontological picture, but ontological construction of the world, what is essential in the destruction of understanding for the transition to comprehension.

Sixthly, on TV there is an idea of ontological reflection, which makes TV fundamental in relation to other ontologies. It is against reflection in relation to fundamental questions - for example, the expression of being - that Heidegger objected. His position is clear - one cannot reflect on the foundations, since the transition of thinking to a more fundamental level is impossible. However, in TV we offer fundamentally new approaches when In conceptual speculation as a constructive and reflective step of thinking, ontological reflection manifests itself:

1. The new ontology is more fundamental in ontological justification, rather than in understanding or explanation.

The ontological justification of TV is a contraflexive juxtaposition of constructive and interpretive ontological positions in expressive difference from the ontological positions of only interpretation or only construction, only understanding or only explanation.

We have an interesting problem of counter-reflexivity of different ontologies. Contra-reflexivity depends on comparable complexity. Paradigmally different ontologies are non-contraflexive. TV is contraflexive within itself and non-contraflexive to other ontologies.

2. The new ontology is built in otherness through comprehension, not understanding, in ideas, not in knowledge.

Through conceptual discretion, a special “structural vision” is built as a new, different experience.

3. The ontology of TV is expressed in a “language” (semiosis) that is more independent of ontics and other ontologies than previous ontologies.

In TV, directional-positional-structural establishments of the concepts of metasemiosis and directional-positional-structural “AB” modeling of construct-semiosis as semiosis independent of ontics are used.

Construct-semiosis and metasemiosis are counter-reflectively juxtaposed as an ontological position of construction and an ontological position of constructive interpretation at the same moment. At the same time, their counter-reflection is the implementation in TV of Quine’s principle of ontological relativity.

4. The ontology of TV as other is functionally-pre-phenomenological-pre-apperceptively fundamental for all ontologies in the theory of apperception, in phenomenology or in language.

In TV this means that its ontological level of normalization is up to the continuum and functional. This made it possible to express structural-continuum, object and process normative ontologies, which represent different large philosophical traditions.

The basic structure of TV realities (empirical, logical, linguistic, thought, speech-text, activity) is also functionally-phenomenologically-apperceptively fundamental.

In TV, functional-phenomenological-apperceptive fundamentality is also presented as the difference between immanent and conceptual apperception.

In conceptual apperception it turns out to be permissible to model the space-time relations themselves and to express inconsistent and/or non-spatial-timeless (positional) processes.

5. The ontology of TV is fundamental to the previous ones from the point of view of the horizon of semantic reflection.

TV as an ontology interprets previous paradigms of philosophical knowledge (Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Husserl, Heidegger, structuralists, SMD methodology) and allows for their constructive interpretation both in metasemiosis and in construct-semiosis - through multi-level norming.

6. The ontology of TV is fundamental to the previous ones in terms of the depth of semantic reflection.

TV introduces new ideas about continuum-apperception, “AB” modeling, directional distance and transstructurality, etc.

7. TV ontology is more heuristically powerful in relation to knowledge in the depth of semantic reflection of previous ontologies.

Based on the ideas of “structural vision,” TV carries out ontological reconstruction in areas of knowledge interpreted by previous ontologies - set theory, apperception theory, truth theory, modality theory, theory of alternative sequence of events, etc. TV is an interdisciplinary theory.

8. The TV ontology has some new properties that were not stated as requirements in previous ontologies.

TV as a new ontology has the property of reflexive traffic, that is, a free two-way (back and forth) transfer of levels of reflection between construct-semiosis and metasemiosis in the position of balance of complexity ontologically and in the counter-reflexive position ontically.

TV as a new ontology distinguishes between rank (interpositional) reflection, using it in the positional-structural establishment of concepts, and semantic (level) reflection, using it in metasemiosis in relation to construct semiosis.

TV as a new ontology expresses an increase in the dimensionality of the world and the dimensionality of structure - which we will talk about further.

TV distinguishes between structural and linguistic norming.

9. TV ontology has a different name and offers a new type of virtual thinking. And as a super task, it offers more general meanings than previous ontologies.

The fundamental theory of the origin and development of human higher mental functions was developed by L. S. Vygotsky (1896–1934). 4 page

Existentialism (or philosophy of existence) is a philosophical movement that emerged in Europe at the end of the 19th century. and became one of the main trends in philosophy of the 20th century. Its representatives were M. Heidegger (1889-1976), K. Jaspers (1883-1969) in Germany; J.-P. Sartre (1905-1980), A. Camus (1913-1960) in France; X. Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) in Spain; N.A. Berdyaev in Russia and others. It is characteristic that it is in existentialism that the actual fusion of literature and philosophy occurs; among its representatives there are Nobel laureates in the field of literature and famous writers. One of them, Jean-Paul Sartre, defined existentialism How philosophy of existence, because it asserts the primacy, the anteriority of the existence of the essence. Man first exists and then acquires his essence:

Thus, first of all, existentialism gives each person ownership of his being and places on him the responsibility for existence.

Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) and Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky are called the forerunners of existentialism; they laid the foundation for the understanding of human existence as existence, experienced reality. The world, not so much knowable as experienced, becomes for existentialists a subject of comprehension. What is a person without his feelings and emotions? Nothing. What makes a person suffer, love or hate, search for himself? The center of philosophical search in existentialism becomes the problems of the meaning of life, freedom and responsibility, rebellion and humility, happiness and peace. The object of research becomes a person, who is the essence of existence. Existence itself is, first of all, the existence of the human soul, feelings, experiences; hence the name existentialism. The true reality of personality is manifested and cognized in its existence in the world where a person free And lonely How to get out of this loneliness? Is freedom a gift or a punishment?

Liberty here it is not considered in a dichotomous pair with necessity, like the dialecticians, but in inextricable connection with responsibility. It is responsibility that is an obligatory companion of freedom, for freedom is not permissiveness or getting rid of sins, but a constant choice.

This was brilliantly described by F. M. Dostoevsky in the novel “Crime and Punishment.” By committing a crime, Raskolnikov strives to free others and free himself. However, besides this, he tries to define himself and his place in the world: “Am I a trembling creature or do I have the right?” - he asks himself. Raskolnikov wants to become, as it were, superman(Dostoevsky, most likely, was not familiar with Nietzsche’s ideas, but Nietzsche read Dostoevsky, for which there is much evidence), become free not only from debts, but also from moral standards, from the need to obey the law. Raskolnikov tests himself. He rebels against injustice and his own smallness. Having divided people into lower and higher, he seeks himself among the higher, but not finding himself, he suffers even more.

Sonechka Marmeladova, with her faith, her love, defeats the evil that lives in Raskolnikov, helps him understand the main meaning of Christian doctrine, which affirms humility, the value of any life and the impossibility of doing good with the help of evil. In faith, Raskolnikov finds the freedom he sought in crime. With the acceptance of faith, he stops rushing about, finds the desired peace and confidence in himself, in the correctness of his path, although it is a path of suffering and hardship. Raskolnikov is the clearest example of the implementation of the principle direct dependence of freedom and responsibility, which is justified by existentialism. The more freedom a person is given, the more responsibility he bears.

Transformative power faith Kierkegaard also postulates. In his works “Either-Or” and “Fear and Trembling,” he argues that a person defines himself only at the moment of choice. We always face a choice, but no matter what choice we make, we will suffer and repent. Only faith saves from painful torment when a person goes beyond boundaries ethical into the sphere religious.

Kierkegaard shows this through the example of the biblical legend of Abraham, from whom God demanded to sacrifice his son Isaac, and Abraham obediently went to the sacrificial mountain to fulfill the will of God. In the Bible, everything ended well. God, convinced of Abraham’s love for himself, allowed him not to kill his son, and even rewarded him. But how did Abraham feel? What thoughts plagued him as he led his son like a lamb to the slaughter? What would happen if he actually killed his son? Would he have become a child killer? By what laws should he be judged? Who would be responsible for Isaac's death - God or Abraham?

All these questions inevitably arise. But Abraham, according to Kierkegaard, knight of faith, he is beyond morality, beyond common sense. It is not difficult to notice some similarities with Nietzsche, for his superman is also beyond morality. The “knight of faith” acts in the name of God, the superman - in the name of himself, but both of them are endowed with the right, as it were, not to notice, to transgress moral norms, even such as “Thou shalt not kill!” J.-P. Sartre wittily notes, analyzing Kierkegaard's plot, that the “voice from heaven” could well turn out to be a hallucination: what then will save Abraham, who is ready to turn into the murderer of his own son?

Sartre himself considers himself to be a member of the atheistic wing of existentialism, believing that man is “doomed to freedom.” Freedom is not a gift, not the acquisition of wings, it is a result loneliness, which in existentialism turns into an ontological characteristic, i.e. Human free, because he's lonely. He is in a state abandonment in the world, he is always alone, since only he bears responsibility for my entire life. Anxiety always accompanies his choice, and if a person does not say to himself at the moment of choice: “Am I acting in such a way that everyone can take an example from my actions?”, he hides anxiety from himself. A person chooses himself and at the same time he chooses all of humanity. For example, if a person chooses marriage or celibacy, joining one party or another, etc., he thereby proclaims his choice value, which I am ready to extend to everyone.

A person is always free while he is alive, and even when he is being led to execution, he can choose whether to go himself or allow others to drag him. We choose in a field of certain possibilities, our choice changes reality and creates new opportunities. Therefore there is always a person project of oneself. By graduating from school, you made it possible to choose whether to go to university or not, a choice that you did not have without a high school diploma. By entering a university, you have created many new opportunities for yourself: to become a good student or a bad one, to graduate from university or to drop out, etc. The main thing is that we don’t just do things, we constantly create ourselves; It depends only on the person whether to be a coward or a brave man, merciful or cruel, kind or evil, etc. We can listen to advice, obey someone else's will, holding someone else responsible for the choice we make, but listening to advice and obeying is also a choice, so no one except ourselves is responsible for what we are. Everyone decides for himself why he lives in this world.

Continuing this idea, Albert Camus, author of the novels “The Stranger”, “The Plague” and others, the philosophical essays “The Myth of Sisyphus”, “The Rebel Man”, creates philosophy of the absurd. Driven by longing for the One, man rushes about in search of the meaning of life, but runs into “walls of absurdity.” What does it mean?

Imagine a conversation between a football fan and a ballet fan. One is ready to tear his hair out because his favorite team lost. Another doesn’t understand how one can worry so much about “nonsense” and runs to stand in a huge line in the cold to get into a performance where a famous ballerina will dance, while spending almost his entire salary on a ticket, which from the point of view of his interlocutor is complete absurd. Who will judge them? God? So he's not there. There is also no core of life given to us from the outside: there is no universal goal, no higher reason, no meaning that could be universal. If we ourselves choose, or rather, invent for ourselves, the meaning of life, does it really exist or is it just a figment of our imagination? So it's easy to change? Can something that is easy to change, like a fashionable dress or an outdated phone model, be considered the meaning of life? No.

Peering into existence, we become witnesses of it absurdity Therefore, the main question of philosophy is the question of whether life is worth living. The logical answer is no, because it makes no sense. Turning into absurd person, we are committing “philosophical suicide”, i.e. We give up any search for the meaning of life. Insight and perseverance make us spectators in the theater of the absurd called “life.” Death and hope exchange words in this drama. Death - the only logical way out of the situation of absurdity, hope - an illusory exit into the meaningfulness of existence. The impetus for comprehending the atmosphere of the absurd is boredom, in itself it is disgusting, but its benefit is that it forces the consciousness to look for a way out.

A person rebels, disagreeing with the logic of life, leading to self-destruction. Rebellion pushes him to development, to action, and therefore all human culture is a product of rebellion. Rebellious man - a symbol of our time, a characteristic of existence in the world of the absurd.

Thus, if Camus and Sartre nevertheless define the arena of man’s search for himself as his own world, then Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Berdyaev transfer it to the area transcendental(extramundane), divine. Their description of the tragedy of human existence in the world leads them to the conviction that finding oneself is possible outside of this world and therefore presupposes the existence of another, higher reality of God that justifies human existence. Man as a subject of history becomes a grain of sand, or, as B. Pascal said, “a thinking reed.” Since man is free according to God’s plan, he is responsible to himself and to God for everything he has done and for the world that he himself creates.

N. A. Berdyaev, in the spirit of Renaissance philosophy, defined a person as microcosm believing that people are free not because they are alone and constantly face a choice, but because they are endowed with the ability create multiply divine creation. From here creation, a break in continuity, going beyond the boundaries of everyday life, is a special way of cognition, based not on logic, but on feeling and inspiration, which makes it possible to directly experience God.

Indeed, if we turn to the Bible, we will see that all the knowledge that people receive from God is received in an act of mystical revelation. For example, he dictates the 10 commandments to Moses, preaches the news of the birth of Jesus to Mary and Joseph, shows John the end of the world, etc. It is this kind of knowledge that N.A. Berdyaev considers superior in comparison with what we call science. But only a free person can comprehend the highest truth, which is why Berdyaev calls his book “Philosophy of Freedom.”

So, the meaning of life is the main question of philosophy. Therefore, to find meaning in life means to justify your life? How? That which is beyond its boundaries, that which is larger and higher than it, that which absorbs it and puts it in the general chain of cause-and-effect relationships. This is well demonstrated by the classic examples of literary heroes - Rodion Raskolnikov (“Am I a trembling creature or do I have the right?”) and Pavka Korchagin from Nikolai Ostrovsky’s novel “This is how the steel was tempered” (“You need to live in such a way that there is no excruciating pain for the years spent aimlessly” ). One can also recall Mayakovsky’s poem “Listen”, surprising in its lyricism, which is not characteristic of the author:

Listen!

After all, if the stars light up, does that mean someone needs it?

So, does anyone want them to exist?

So, someone calls these spittoons

a pearl?

And, straining

in the blizzards of midday dust, rushes to God, is afraid that he is late, kisses his sinewy hand, asks -

there must be a star! - swears -

will not endure this starless torment.

For the hero, “starless torment” is unbearable; in other words, without stars his life is meaningless. Like any artistic generalization, an image stars can embody anything: the light of truth (the desire for which was the meaning of the philosopher’s life, but for Plato), the love of a woman and childbirth (that which brings meaning to existence, according to V. Rozanov), the moral law (“The starry sky above me and the moral the law is in me,” as Kant wrote), etc. Another thing is important - the search for the meaning of life is taken beyond the boundaries of life itself, of subjective existence itself. In other words, to find meaning in life you need to get out of the situation abandonment And loneliness, which, according to the existentialist tradition, is an ontological given of every person. N.A. Berdyaev might have added: if this person is outside of God.

José Ortega y Gasset suggests, so to speak, social version existentialism. He draws attention to the fact that the spiritual situation of the 20th century. changes radically compared to previous eras, since today a person feels himself to be part of an impersonal principle, crowds. Ortega’s most famous work, “The Revolt of the Masses,” is devoted to the analysis of a new type of person - man-mass.

Man-mass created by the means of mass communication (note that Ortega did not yet know the Internet), mass culture, it is aggressive, intolerant of manifestations of individualism and dissent. Belonging to the masses is not a person’s social status or place, but a psychological characteristic: an average, ordinary, standard person. The mass man asserts himself not by ascending to the heights of culture, but by bringing down to himself the social norms and guidelines of this culture. Mass culture, mass tastes, fashion, etc. begin to dominate, suppressing genuine art, high literature, etc. Instead of “War and Peace” by L. N. Tolstoy, many schoolchildren, for example, read comics, since many classic literary works have been translated into this format. Ortega seems to echo Berdyaev, who wrote that the New Age was characterized by a “plebeian spirit” of envy and hatred of the aristocracy:

The simplest man of the people may not be a plebeian in this sense. And then in a man there may be traits of real aristocracy, who never envy, there may be hierarchical traits of his own breed, ordained by God.

Ortega sets the task of education new elite, the hallmarks of which are competence, professional and cultural potential. It highlights a certain intermediate layer honest workers] they do not reach heights in art, culture, science, but they do their work well, are interested in the achievements of art, do not consider themselves the standard of taste, and are ready to accept new things and change their guidelines. It is easy to see that the criterion for dividing all people into different types is reflexivity And morality.

German existentialism develops in inextricable connection with phenomenology in line with the academic university tradition. In 1927, Martin Heidegger’s book “Being and Time” was published, in which one of the key concepts of existentialism appears - Dasein), which translates as “here-being”. The very definition of being comes from Heidegger's dependence on time. Let us remember the philosophy of the Middle Ages. In the teachings of Augustine we encounter the thesis about the absence of three times - past, present And future, since the first and last do not exist, but only the present. This position is partly reproduced by Heidegger. For him the present and there is being. The main characteristic of human existence is finitude, temporality. Reflection in the face of death, understood as nothingness, the experience of one's finitude is common to all existentialists. Heidegger believes time the defining characteristic of existence. At the same time, it breaks down into internal time And vulgar(physical), which science deals with, measured in hours, minutes, etc.

What is it internal time? This relevance. Imagine that some tragedy happened in the past that deeply hurt you? Here And Now is this experience present? Is this tragedy happening to you? Can you be physically present at a lecture, but your thoughts be somewhere else? Maybe yes. But are you present at a lecture if your thoughts are far away? Being as existence- this is always the present, this is what we represent here and now, what fills our life, being present in it as a basic experience. It is probably already clear that under being Existentialism understands the inner world of man. That is why about the philosophy of the 20th century. they say she lets herself in psychologism.

The central moment of here-being, according to Heidegger, is care, making existence authentic. Care is a way of connecting a person with the outside world; it structures being, manifesting itself through “already-being-in-the-world” - the mode of the past; “looking ahead” is the mode of the future; “being with (nearby)” is the mode of the present. The past and future are always with us, since they are included in the sphere of our experiences, and, consequently, in the structure of the present. If you have ever had to experience a past insult or delight, joyful anticipation of a meeting, holiday, etc., i.e. that which is physically located beyond the boundaries of the present, but forms part of your emotional world, you yourself felt the united and inextricable structure of here-being.

World of Things (May) obscures the finitude of existence from us, giving rise to the illusion of its endless continuation, and the stimulus for existence becomes fear. An attempt to repress fear is futile until a person dares to look into nothingness. Fear pushes a person to search for the meaning of life, and a person sacrifices his life to his destiny, and the fear of not finding a destiny makes the readiness for self-sacrifice a constant characteristic of life. The desire to go beyond finitude pushes us to accept divine revelations, search for grandiose achievements that will prolong our existence in culture, leads to a sacred attitude towards childbirth, understood as a way to preserve ourselves in offspring, etc. However, the unconditional, the genuine must be sought within oneself, accepting one’s own as inevitable. limb.

Existence is revealed to us in unconscious actions and moods, which is why it is unknowable by rational means. To cognize existence, one must enter into it feel it, you cannot see it, you can listen to it.

Who will understand another easier - the one who has experienced something similar himself, or the goth who has read a bunch of books on psychology and can explain everything? Who is considered a good psychologist - one who knows many techniques and knows how to use them, or one who, based on this knowledge, can intuitively feel another? Answer these questions yourself.

Karl Jaspers subscribes to the opinion that philosophy, exploring being, cannot be a “rigorous science,” therefore, the best designation for doing philosophy, in his opinion, is the term “philosophizing.” A psychologist by training (in 1909 he received a doctorate in psychiatry and in 1913 he became a doctor of psychology), Jaspers considered philosophy his highest goal and was extremely proud of becoming a professor of philosophy at Heidelberg. However, he left teaching at the request of the Nazi authorities, since he was married to a Jewish woman, and devoted himself entirely to research. In 1931, his main book, “The Spiritual Situation of the Epoch,” was published.

Philosophizing, according to Jaspers, is devoid of strict rules, like science, but only in it can one grasp “human reality filled with misery and care.” There are two forms of philosophizing - philosophizing in the face of things(ordinary consciousness, materialistic concepts, etc.) and philosophizing as existence, which manifests itself in borderline situations (in the face of death, collapse, etc.). Concept border situation turned out to be very popular both in philosophy and psychology. Our authenticity self, what we really are manifests itself exclusively in a situation associated with the transition to nothing. Only here does a person discover his own essence, discarding the numerous masks that we use in life. That is why deep sincere communication, or “communication in truth,” is valued, which is sorely lacking in modern man. Existence is the direct experience of being or empathy, making the being of another part of our own being.

Existence not only takes us out of the isolation of the objective world, but also allows us to relate ourselves to the higher world ( transcendence), what in traditional religions is called God. Philosophy, by its own means, comes to comprehend the transcendental, leading the philosophizing subject into a certain metaphysical space. The main remedy is philosophical faith, which is different from religious faith, which does not reason. Philosophical faith, on the contrary, requires comprehension and reasoning over the subject, but it is precisely this, and not rational-logical knowledge, that is the way to comprehend the essence of being, because it carries irrationality, existence, because being cannot be understood, one can only feel it.

All types of human existence develop within the framework stories. Man is condemned to remain in history, thrown into it. History is a situation when a person realizes that inner conviction is primary in relation to historical action, that any situation should be perceived without falling into cynicism and despair. Here we can clearly see the line of the Stoics, who called for coming to terms with an inexorable fate.

Historical development tends towards the triumph of totalitarianism (fascism, communism), it is impossible to resist this by social means, it is possible only by psychological ones, only the individual has internal limitations that can prevent the spread of totalitarianism.

Thus, Karl Jaspers remains in line with the existential tradition, considering the meaning of life as the central problem and offering recipes for solving personal and social problems. His views perfectly demonstrate the closeness of philosophy and psychology during this period, illustrating the spread of psychologism in philosophy. It is characteristic that many psychological theories of the 20th century. acquire the status of philosophical. How does this happen?

Sartre J.-P. Existentialism is humanism // Twilight of the Gods: an anthology. M.: Politizdat, 1989. P. 325.
Berdyaev II. L. Philosophy of inequality. M.: IMA-Kress, 1995. P. 136.

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