Command secret wire symbol publication. Rokossovites in Chukotka or the secret of Providence Bay - from military history, science, practice - catalog of articles - dvoku, dvi, dvvku graduates, unite!!! Small arms and artillery

Dugouts, pillboxes, concrete command bunkers, firing points, the remains of barracks and rare witnesses - these are the few things that preserve the memory of that time. Let’s try, based on evidence, to restore at least a piece of mysterious time, which you cannot erase from the history of Chukotka, you cannot change, just as you cannot change the past.

Mid 1945. Nazi Germany has been defeated, war with Japan is on the horizon, Stalin is hastily solving one of the most important tasks for maintaining his power. The marshal's "pets", adored by the people, who won the war on the battlefield, and not in the offices, became contenders for power and influence over the people. With the speed of a card player, the Generalissimo exiles famous commanders to different parts of the vast empire. Marshal Zhukov is sent to Germany, Marshals Meretskov, Malinovsky, Vasilevsky - to the Far East, Marshal Rokossovsky is appointed commander of the Northern Group of Forces. The troops entrusted to the marshals are hastily dispersed across the vast expanses of the Fatherland.

In August 1945, the blitz war with the Japanese began and in a few days was completed with the complete defeat of the Kwantung Army.

After the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the Americans, the situation in the world changes dramatically. The Americans are turning from war allies into adversaries for many decades. Stalin's leadership hastily begins to strengthen the borders of the empire.

Some of the troops that successfully acted against the Kwantung Army and distinguished themselves in the war with Germany are loaded onto ships. The troops are attached to units stationed in the regions of Moscow, who fought under the command of Marshal Rokossovsky.

It was late autumn, the Bering Sea was stormy. Ships filled with soldiers. weapons, ammunition, food, went to sea and headed north. Soldiers and officers talked among themselves about how the army was being sent to capture Alaska. A nervous excitement, fueled by alcohol, reigned.

Imagine the disappointment of the soldiers when the ships entered the bay, surrounded by lifeless rocky mountains. Unloading was carried out hastily. Frosts struck, the sea was frozen, the ships had to return to Nakhodka.

The army landed in Providence Bay was actually forced to survive in extreme conditions.

To survive in the frozen snows of Chukotka, it was necessary to build at least some kind of housing. Thus, the vast expanse of the Providence Bay coast turned into a construction site. Dugouts were erected, firing points were set up, trenches and bomb shelters were dug, and barracks were built.

The tops of a number of hills were occupied as firing points for anti-aircraft batteries, artillery was placed along the coastline, and tanks were camouflaged in secluded ravines. In a matter of weeks, a lifeless, wild place turned into a powerful defensive point. Roads were built to numerous firing points, ammunition depots and fuel tanks were driven into the ground. The need to increase vigilance was hammered into the personnel, because an attack by the American imperialists on Chukotka was possible.

During the first harsh winter, the soldiers lived in barracks built from planks, between which slag or earth was poured, in insulated tents, or even in primitive dugouts. They managed to build prefabricated wooden Finnish houses for the officers. Both officers and soldiers lived cramped and dirty, but there was a lot of drink and food.

According to eyewitnesses, the blizzards in those years were incredibly powerful. Coal was delivered by ships only to the territory of the seaport. When the roads were swept away and the cars were suffocating in the snow, a chain of soldiers lined up, and with backpacks, from hand to hand, the coal was delivered to Ureliki, to the barracks and housing, which were located five to seven kilometers from the seaport. With the arrival of the military, the commercial port itself began to grow rapidly. To supply the army, not only food, ammunition, uniforms were required, but especially a lot of fuel and cement for the construction of pillboxes, loopholes and bomb shelters, underground command posts; even then they were thinking about nuclear war. A lot of military equipment was imported.

At the same time, the airfield, which had previously served as a reserve airfield for ferrying military aircraft along the Alaska-Siberia route, was hastily expanded. They say that prisoners from the “mainland” worked at the airfield. I could not find any documents confirming this. But the fact that prisoners were used in the construction of military airfields in Chukotka is an established fact that requires special study. For several years, the latest MIGs were based in Provideniya, then they were relocated to Anadyr.

In the early fifties, Provideniya became one of the largest military bases in the North. Hundreds of tanks, hundreds of artillery and anti-aircraft pawns. Tens of thousands of soldiers and officers were ready to fight to the death for the northern borders.

It is now difficult to establish the names of the units that fought under the command of the famous Marshal Rokossovsky, but for some reason all the soldiers who were in Providence were called Rokossovites. And the soldiers themselves at that time proudly called themselves Rokossovites. Dashing, uncontrollable guys. Behind them are two wars, two victories, a sea of ​​blood, deaths, and risks. The uniforms of soldiers and officers are hung with orders for valor and heroism, and on you - for having won, for shedding blood. Discontent was expressed in drinking and violence against women.

Lyudmila Ivanovna Adnany, now a senior researcher at the Institute of Scientific Research of the Ministry of Defense of the RSFSR, recalls:

“At that time I was nine years old, I was studying in a boarding school, living with my grandfather. When the Rokossovites were sent to Provideniya, life became very scary. They drank heavily, cases of violence against women were frequent. At night the houses were locked with all the hooks, bolts and locks. When they, drunk, knocked on the windows and demanded that the women come out immediately, we “died” from fear.

People began to leave Providence, especially women. When I ran to school past the barracks - they were located right next to the hill - I was shaking all over with fear. There were women working in the laundry here, and there were always fights over them. They were even guarded, but many women tried to quickly get married, even to an old man, just to leave here.

One day, an officer dropped into our boarding school, pulled out a pistol, kicked us out into the middle of the room and began shouting that we were enemies of the people and could sell ourselves to the Americans at any moment. Some girls hid under their bunks out of fear. Two boys managed to sneak out of the room and ran after the school principal. He was also an officer, he fought and quickly captured our offender. Then they said that the officer was shell-shocked, in general, something was wrong with his psyche.

There was also a military hospital here, and there were rumors that some experiments were being carried out on people there, causing people, even women, to go bald. Well, they brought rams specially for the experiments. I don’t know how true this was, but I remember such rumors well, even though I was little. While Rokossovites were in Provideniya, local residents tried not to come here. A rumor spread throughout the tundra: you can’t go to Provideniya - it’s dangerous. I also had to leave, and I returned to Provideniya a few years later, when the Rokossovites were sent to the “mainland”.

But here is the story of Liliya Petrovna Ryazanova, now a pensioner, somewhat similar to previous memories:

“My mother and older sister and I came to Ureliki, which is located on the other side of the bay, in 1942. There were no military personnel here except border guards. We built a hut out of wooden boxes and lived in it. Mom got a job as a cleaner in a bakery, and the older sister worked in the canteen. The border guards behaved very well and helped us: they brought water and coal.

When the war ended, a lot of soldiers arrived. They were called Rokossovtsy and Chernopogonniki. The Black Pogonians behaved badly. We were so afraid of them! Young women were raped right on the street. They didn't kill, but they raped. They went from house to house with machine guns and looked for young women. There were cases when women were directly torn away from their husbands, who stood up for their wives and were severely beaten. Border guards always came to the rescue.

One winter we were walking with the girls on the street; I was eleven years old at the time. We see that there are many soldiers lined up on the parade ground. We ran to see what was happening there. An officer in the center of the square says: “For a traitor to the Motherland who violated his oath!” The soldiers raised their rifles and shot at the man. We became so scared that we started running home.

It seems that in 1943, border guards gathered all the civilians and said that we are no longer able to protect them, everyone needs to leave here. All civilians were resettled with relatives in neighboring villages where there were no black-pogonians.

We returned to Providence in 1953 or 1954, when the Rokossov soldiers were no longer there. For a long time we were afraid of soldiers. It used to happen that when I saw a soldier, my heart would just sink with fear. Now I understand everything, but before..."

Vasily Polikazpovich Izergen, pensioner, in the village of Provideniya since 1943:

“I worked in the port as a loader and I remember how the Rokossovites arrived. It was already late autumn, the cold weather had set in. Then there were many units littered throughout the bay. There were tankers, anti-aircraft gunners, there was even a naval battery.

The division headquarters was located in Provideniya, and the army headquarters was on the other side of the bay - in Ureliki. The army was commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union General Oleshev. The general was young and handsome. There was order here under him. The roads were kept in excellent condition. It used to be that a general would ride in a passenger car with his adjutants, where he would shake things down, they would write them down, and then immediately scold the person in charge of the section of the road. The next morning the road is smooth.

There was a lot of construction going on back then. The military was disrupting our port. There was a lot of cargo and weapons. There are concrete fortifications everywhere. Then the bay was impregnable. The tanks were quickly removed from Providence; they were not needed here - the tundra, elm trees. We loaded them onto ships at night and sent them to the “mainland”.

In 1952, Marshal R. Malinovsky came. I saw him, he was in our port. Now they say that Marshal Rokossovsky was twice in Providence, but I don’t know anything about that. Maybe he came secretly for an inspection? At one time he was the chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense. In general, I didn't see him. The army of Rokossovites began to be gradually removed from Chukotka after Malinovsky’s arrival. Thanks to the army, our village was greatly upset."

The personality of General N. Oleshev interested me. Sparse data suggests that Nikolai Nikolaevich Oleshev was born in Yaroslavl into a Russian working-class family in 1903. Volunteered at the age of sixteen to go to civil war. At twenty-three he graduated from cavalry school. This, apparently, is where the general’s love for horses stems from. They say that “even in Chukotka, the commanders of the units entrusted to him loved to prance on horses.

To the Great Patriotic War N. Oleshev commanded the corps. In 1945, his corps as part of the Transbaikal Front entered the war with Japan. It was in this war that the young general distinguished himself. His corps went on the offensive on August 9, 1945, quickly crossed the B. Khingan ridge and attacked the enemy. In 15 days of fighting, the corps advanced 950 kilometers, captured about 2,500 enemy soldiers and officers, and many weapons and equipment. In September 1945, Nikolai Nikolaevich Oleshev received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and was sent with the army to Chukotka. In 1948, the general graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff, and in 1963 he retired. He lived in Riga and died in 1970.

When I was collecting materials about the Rokossovites, some people said that we should not bring up the dark sides of the troops’ presence in Chukotka, they say, now they speak badly of our army. The last thing I would like to do is blame the soldiers who, after the bloody war, found themselves in the snows of Chukotka.

I have been to the battle positions of the Rokossovites more than once. At the beginning of summer, when fireweed blooms thickly and radiola rosea (golden root) blazes with sunny yellow, concrete fortifications, the remains of barracks made of wild stone, seem like ulcers on the green body of the tundra. In early autumn, when the grass is barely touched by yellowness, the leaves of the dwarf tundra birch are tinted with a light purple, and the sedge rustles in the wind like tin, former military installations merge with the tundra and become inconspicuous.

In the ruins I came across a soldier's stool with a hole in the center. The inventory number and the year of either manufacture or inventory were cut out from below - 1945. The stool turned out to be almost the same age as me. Unlike humans, wood in Chukotka does not smolder for a long time.

Examining the bomb shelter dug in the hill, I opened the massive, half-meter thick, armored door and squeezed inside. The darkness smelled damp. Curiosity pulled me into the belly of the bunker. I took a few steps down the circle of concrete stairs, and suddenly the outer door creaked. It seemed to me that it was closing. I jumped out of the concrete bag like a bullet. If the armored colossus had slammed shut, I would not have opened it from the inside. When would they find me in this concrete prison?

At one of the tops of the hills, where an anti-aircraft battery previously stood, a power station with a burnt diesel engine, concrete loopholes, and dugouts still remain. From the top, the narrow entrance to the bay is clearly visible. Militarily, the location was well chosen. The battery was virtually invulnerable, the nearby hills protected it from air raids, but what was it like for the soldiers to live in the winter at this altitude, when the wind blows it out to sea? Months, years, life on this rocky peak! What a lot of work it took to erect concrete fortifications here, build dugouts, a power plant, and carve a road along the slope!

What influenced not the decision of Marshal Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky, at that time the commander of the newly created Far Eastern Military District, to decide to withdraw the Rokossovites from Chukotka? Exorbitantly high costs of maintaining the army? Complaints about soldiers' bad behavior? Most likely, military doctrine began to change. Wartime equipment was outdated and was replaced by more sophisticated equipment, and more sophisticated equipment required educated soldiers.

By the mid-fifties, the Rokossovites were no longer in Chukotka. Army units began to replace missile forces. In distant Providence, a small town of rocket scientists was built with barracks, a power plant and even a rocket assembly workshop. Well, off we go. I was told by a loader who was transporting rocket parts disassembled in boxes. “Usually, these boxes were loaded onto cars at the port at night, taken to the town, to the barbed wire, and then the soldiers unloaded the boxes. We were not allowed into the base. The security was strong. There were towers all around, several rows of barbed wire.”

The rocket crews were well supplied with food. They say that even in winter they were given grapes, lemons, apples, and vegetables.

The missiles were assembled at the base and transported to launch pads, of which there were a great many around Providence Bay. Both the roads and the launch sites themselves were classified and well guarded. Radio direction finder buildings remain on the hills. It was impossible to make roads through the rocky hills, so the soldiers carried all the building materials on themselves.

How many missiles were delivered to Provideniya? Who will answer this question now? One thing is absolutely clear: to assemble a dozen missiles, they would not have built an assembly shop that worked intensively for several years.

When you think about how many people have been to Providence Bay, a question involuntarily arises. What is so remarkable about this piece of land that it was so protected? Why was he so absurdly guarded for almost forty years?

The mystery can be slightly revealed if we remember that since the mid-fifties, our army has been intensively equipped with atomic weapons. Old residents of Providence said that they saw nuclear submarines in the fiords. Wasn’t the military command planning to build a nuclear submarine base here? The location is excellent. Deep-sea, mountainous people could hide more than one nuclear submarine in the fiords.

The missiles from Provideniya began to be removed in the early seventies. The rocket town is now in ruins, as if after the bombing. Heating pipes are sticking out, electrical wires are hanging, roads are overgrown with grass, only machine gun nests made of stone have not been touched by time. They can be used at any moment.

You never cease to be amazed at how much money the state spent on the construction and maintenance of military bases in the North. Billions were driven into concrete bunkers, barracks, launch pads, and the impoverished villages of Chukotka stood nearby. Did the command really not know that on the opposite side of the Bering Strait there are almost no troops or military bases of a defensive nature?

We recently learned from the press that during the creation of the atomic shield, atomic charges were collected in various parts of Russia, including Chukotka. So where were the atomic warheads assembled: in Provideniya or Anadyr? Is this why the background radiation around these settlements is slightly higher than in other places, which has also been written about more than once in the newspapers? Again a mystery.

From secrets, as always, legends and rumors are born. They say that in the late sixties, somewhere in the mountains of Chukotka, an atomic device was allegedly detonated. There are rumors that there are still nuclear weapons storage facilities in Chukotka. Is this speculation? Who will tell us the truth? My short story about the Rokossovites is a tiny piece of what was previously hidden from us.

History is learned not from sheer curiosity alone, but also in order to learn useful lessons from the past. What have we all learned from the recent militaristic frenzy?

Chukotka, as before, is oversaturated with troops. As in previous years, there are a lot of tanks, artillery, airplanes, missiles and other military equipment. Thousands of people are bound by army laws to barracks, guns, and parade grounds. Again, billions are being spent on maintaining an army in the snows of Chukotka. Now who are we protecting ourselves from? From the Americans? For mercy's sake, do they need us? They don't even need us for nothing. No, the militaristic frenzy in us has not faded away.

I won’t talk about how sick the tundra is from exposure to technology, including military technology. Everyone knows this well. Isn't it time to declare Chukotka a land free of military bases, missiles and other weapons? We are not so rich as to have tank battalions, infantry divisions, and missile divisions in every village.

Evgeny Rozhkov

The idea of ​​​​the possibility of listening to Soviet submarine cable communication lines was first conceived at the end of 1970 by James Bradley, head of the underwater operations department of the US Navy Intelligence Agency. Perhaps this idea arose from his acquaintance with the experience of German submarines during the Second World War in listening to transatlantic cables, or, perhaps, from a careful study of navigation maps of the seas adjacent to the Soviet coast, which indicated areas prohibited for trawling fish, or perhaps from -for other reasons. But be that as it may, it was Bradley who proposed using the nuclear submarine Helibat for these purposes, which had brilliantly coped with the discovery of the sunken Soviet submarine K-129. He chose the Sea of ​​Okhotsk as the area where this problem could initially be successfully solved. Here, according to his calculations, a telephone cable was to run connecting the missile submarine base in the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky area with the mainland, with the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok and Moscow. According to him, information about plans for the use of submarines, missile firing and combat training tasks, information about nuclear arsenals, the support and maintenance system for missile carriers, etc. was supposed to be transmitted. All this data was of exceptional value to US naval intelligence. The American side was also attracted by the fact that underwater cable communication lines were supposed to transmit mainly unclassified information or information of relatively low cryptographic strength.

Initially, the department headed by Bradley considered three areas where there was the greatest likelihood of laying underwater military communications cables and where there was a possibility of connecting to them using submarines: the Baltic, Barents and Okhotsk seas. Preference was given to the last of the three areas, since Kamchatka had one of the largest strategic missile submarine bases in the Navy, it was most isolated from the main command authorities on the mainland, and in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk one could expect the least resistance from Soviet anti-submarine forces sides.

Submarine "Helibat"

At the same time, along with the obvious attractiveness of the idea proposed by Bradley, it was accompanied by a number of factors that could significantly complicate its implementation.

First of all, how can one find a cable at the bottom of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk - a total area of ​​611,000 square miles - supposedly no more than 13 centimeters thick? The problem is difficult to solve, but solvable. Solved by another brilliant idea suggested by Bradley. Remembering how as a child, sailing along the Mississippi River, he saw warning signs on its banks that read “Cable. Do not drop anchor!”, Bradley suggested looking for similar signs on the coast of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. Having found them at a certain point on the shore using a boat periscope, it will then be possible to significantly limit the subsequent search area for the cable at the bottom of the sea.

It was also necessary to take into account the fact that connection to the underwater cable was supposed to be at depths of 100-130 meters, and this is unsafe for submarine divers who carry it out without the appropriate equipment. A solution to this problem was found by creating special diving equipment and equipping the Helibat submarine with a special decompression chamber during the modernization.

There was also negative experience with American submarines searching for what was supposed to be a Soviet cable hydrophone system off the island of Sicily in the early 70s. This operation was carried out under the intelligence and patronage of Bradley's department, which believed that the Soviets had deployed a sonar surveillance system similar to the American SOSUS in the Mediterranean Sea. Several reconnaissance cruises by American submarines were unsuccessful. It was only on the last voyage, which included the nuclear submarine Seahorse and the midget submarine NR-1, that the object of so much effort was discovered, but it turned out to be an Italian telephone cable, abandoned since the Second World War. The consequences for naval intelligence and, in particular, for the authority of Bradley's department, on the part of the leadership of the US Navy after this fiasco were quite noticeable. However, the correct conclusions were drawn from this negative result, and not without benefit for subsequent reconnaissance operations under water.

And one last thing. It was necessary to convince the Navy command, as well as the top US military-political leadership, of the feasibility and necessity of this complex, expensive and very risky operation to connect to the Soviet submarine communication line. After all, we were talking about the property of another country, unauthorized access to its “holy of holies” - state secrets with a possible violation of territorial waters. This could lead to far-reaching dangerous consequences, including great loss of life.

Bradley first reported his plan to his immediate superior, Rear Admiral Hullfinger, Chief of Naval Intelligence, and then to Admiral Zumwalt, Chief of Staff of the US Navy, and enlisted their support. Only one other person in the highest echelons of the Navy command, besides these individuals, was informed about the upcoming top-secret operation - the commander of the submarine forces of the US Pacific Fleet.

Bradley was also forced to inform another super-secret organization about his plans - the National Underwater Reconnaissance Center. This center had dual departmental subordination - to the command of the Navy and the CIA. He oversaw the most complex and risky operations of the American submarine force. With the help of this center and the CIA, Bradley hoped to achieve large allocations for the very expensive operation he had planned.

Here we should make a small digression.

Around the same period, the CIA, independent of naval intelligence, also became interested in the region. One of the best analysts in the CIA's strategic research department, Ray Boyle, drew attention to a seemingly insignificant fact given in one of the intelligence reports. It said that on Soviet navigation charts of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk marked “For official use,” which were intended for captains and navigators of fishing vessels, the neck of Shelikhov Bay between the Kamchatka Peninsula and the mainland was declared prohibited for trawling and fishing. Typically, such measures were taken when some kind of underwater work was carried out in the area, such as laying a pipeline. But a careful study of various reference and information literature did not confirm this version. Then it was decided to carry out a detailed aerospace photo reconnaissance of the suspicious area.

Photocosmic reconnaissance images obtained after some time yielded unexpected results. On the coast of the peninsula and the mainland in this area, no traces of engineering and earthworks were found. However, something else was established: from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky on the eastern coast of the peninsula to Palana on the western coast, relatively recently an underground communications line was being laid, which broke off before reaching the coast of the bay. To clarify the information received, it was decided to use an intelligence source in Kamchatka. But here specialists from Langley met with failure - contact with the source was lost. Representatives of the strategic research department did not despair and again began to analyze and summarize all available information on this issue. The determining factors in the formation of the final version of the analysts were the following: the presence of a base for Soviet strategic missile submarines in Krasheninnikov Bay near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, the Kura Battlefield training ground in the northeastern part of the peninsula, designed to support firing of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and also an underground communications line connecting Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky with the western coast of the peninsula. Taking this into account, the conclusion was made that an underwater communication cable was laid along the bottom of the neck of Shelikhov Bay in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, and important military information, including those related to testing intercontinental ballistic missiles, could be transmitted through it. A detailed report outlining all the information on this issue and the rationale for the final conclusion was submitted to the Director of the US CIA.

It should be noted that relations between members of the US intelligence community have always been difficult, and this especially applied to the CIA and the DIA. (Let’s just remember the story of the recovery of the sunken Soviet submarine K-129.) Fierce competition between them, sometimes “on the verge of a foul,” often led to the fact that the indicated departments could deal with the same issue without knowing about it and without informing each other. This was the case in this particular case: the representative of naval intelligence, Bradley, did not know what the CIA officer Boyle was doing, and vice versa. Information on this extremely important problem, for the above reasons, could only be found at the very top of the hierarchical service ladder, but even there it was used mainly from the point of view of departmental interests.

Now, after many years, the CIA, the DIA, and naval intelligence are trying, at first glance, to unobtrusively present their own version that it was their organization that initiated and implemented this, one of the most successful, as they believe , American intelligence operations. But for us this is not the main thing, but the obviousness that the idea did arise and it had to be translated into reality.

So, for Bradley, the most important thing now remained - to convince US National Security Assistant Kissinger and his chief military adviser, General Haig. It depended on these key figures in American politics whether and how the proposed operation would be approved at all.

At that time, all covert operations carried out abroad were considered by the so-called “Committee of 40”. Its members included the director of the CIA, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other senior officials of the US government and Congress. After the capture of the American reconnaissance ship Pueblo39 at the meetings this committee all foreign intelligence operations were to be considered, including the most routine ones: CIA operations in the “third world” countries, wiretapping of government communications in the Kremlin, the actions of American submarines in the coastal waters of the USSR, flights of reconnaissance aircraft over the territory of other countries, etc. Members of this commission previously reviewed and made recommendations on the possibility of approving a particular operation. The Chairman of the Committee of 40 was Kissinger, on whom it depended on how this or that issue would be reported and what procedure would be chosen for its approval. In a number of cases, Kissinger could coordinate this or that operation over the phone, and sometimes he took full responsibility for certain actions upon himself.

Bradley secretly hoped for this option when he first reported his plan to Kissinger and Haig. Most of all, he was worried about possible questions from the commission members about the acceptable degree of risk in this operation. Since, for example, in order to search for the previously mentioned navigation signs on the Soviet coast, the submarine would need to enter three-mile territorial waters, which was a generally recognized violation of the sovereignty of another state, which could entail very dangerous consequences for the American side. But Bradley's report was so convincing that Kissinger decided to take responsibility himself and, bypassing the members of the Committee of 40, personally report to President Nixon about the need for such an operation.

So, the way was open for the nuclear submarine Helibat to sail into the Sea of ​​Okhotsk.

"Helibat" in a new role

In the late summer of 1971, the submarine Helibat was completing repairs and refits for its new mission. In addition to the numerous special equipment she had, a deep-sea rescue vehicle DSRV was installed on the hull of the boat. However, this device was not intended to be used in accordance with its main purpose, but to ensure the work of divers at great depths as a decompression and airlock chamber.

In October, the Helibat left its Mare Island base and headed for the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. The transition was carried out north of the Aleutian Islands through the Bering Sea to avoid unnecessary contact with Soviet ships. Any nuclear submarine would have completed this journey in less than two weeks, but the Helibat took more than a month to complete it. Her onboard reactor from the 50s did not allow her to reach a speed of more than 13 knots, and a device located on the upper deck further slowed down her movement and reduced her speed to 10 knots.

Getting directly into the Sea of ​​Okhotsk was also a very difficult task. The submarine maneuvered for several hours in the coastal fairway between the northernmost island of the Kuril ridge and the southern tip of Kamchatka. But the submariners were rewarded for their long torment with a beautiful view of an active volcano on the coast of the peninsula that opened up to them through the periscope.

Now they could begin to carry out their main task for which they had come here - searching for an underwater cable. Meanwhile, it should be noted that a very limited part of the crew knew about the main purpose of the visit to the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk: the boat commander, Commander McNish, some officers, divers and representatives of the “special projects team” (in other words, “cave inhabitants”), who were responsible for reconnaissance and technical support for the operation.

The submarine was constantly at periscope depth, visually examining the coast of the peninsula in search of special navigational indicators. In addition, every three hours she was forced to turn back: it was necessary to make sure that she was not being tracked by a Soviet anti-submarine submarine. This went on for more than a week, until a sign was finally discovered in the northern part of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk on one section of the coast, warning of the need to be careful due to the presence of a cable here.

After this, it was possible to move on to the underwater part of the operation. A remote-controlled device equipped with a television camera and spotlight was released from the submarine. Operators, while on board the boat, could observe the underwater situation on monitor screens, recorded by a television camera. But then some strange marks appeared on the screen in the form of dark mounds on the seabed, repeating with a certain periodicity. Visibility underwater was not very good, so it was not possible to unambiguously classify the resulting images. Only after special processing of the resulting film in the laboratory on board, analysis of the color photographs taken, did the staff photographer and a representative of the “special projects team” come to the conclusion that an underwater cable had been discovered.

The Helibat commander checked the submarine's location to see if they were in a restricted three-mile zone off the coast. The boat moved even further to the west, and at a distance of about 40 miles from the coast, a suitable place was found for placing the Helibat on underwater anchors directly above the cable running along the bottom. A decompression chamber with divers on board was lowered to the bottom.

The divers attached a special recording device about three feet long to the cable. The recording equipment of this device could record messages and signals transmitted through various channels over several days. This lifespan was ensured by the lithium battery it contained. After the connection of the listening device to the cable was completed, electronic intelligence specialists on board the boat were able to personally listen to the transmitted information and make sure that the equipment was working.

So, the main part of the operation was carried out successfully. Moreover, everything went so quickly and smoothly that the overwhelming majority of the crew was firmly convinced that the discovery of the Russian submarine cable was an accident. After all, the official legend for them was a submarine’s voyage to search for a new Soviet anti-ship missile that sank during testing. This task was also set for Helibat, but it was not the main one. With the help of an on-board sonar and an underwater television camera, the crash site of the rocket was soon discovered, and divers filled a gondola specially attached to the hull of the boat with its debris. After this, the Helibat headed to the shores of the United States to its home base. Three months later she moored at her home pier in Mare Island.

Upon arrival, the received recordings were transferred to the National Security Agency for decryption, and the fragments of the Soviet rocket raised from the bottom were sent to a secret laboratory of the Ministry of Energy. Later, a response was received from the National Security Agency that the submitted recordings indeed contained very valuable intelligence information: negotiations between the command of the strategic submarine base and the leadership of the Soviet Navy. Moreover, a significant part of the information was not encoded or its decoding was not particularly difficult.

Installation of a new "cocoon"

Meanwhile, Bradley was pondering the future prospects for operations to tap Soviet cable communications. The device, which was attached to a cable in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, could detect signals in only a few channels and record them for a relatively short period of time. Bradley dreamed that interception would be carried out on almost all channels of the communication cable and for several months. This would make it unnecessary for the submarine to constantly be in the area of ​​the cable line and would allow for a more acceptable option to periodically return the submarine to the area to collect accumulated information.

In order to implement their boss's idea, representatives of the underwater operations department commissioned one of the Bell laboratories to develop a much more efficient device. The new device had the shape of a cylinder (the Americans called it a “cocoon”) more than six meters long and about a meter wide and weighed about six tons. It was equipped with a nuclear power plant. The electronic equipment located in it made it possible to intercept enemy messages over dozens of communication lines and record them for several months. Unlike the previous device, it was not attached directly to the cable, but was placed next to it, using the induction effect for its operation. Thus, as American experts believed, the process of intercepting intelligence information from a legal point of view did not violate the norms of international law.

By August 1972, the development of the new device was completed, and Helibat set off on its second voyage to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. This time the underwater cable was found almost immediately. With the help of divers, the listening device was placed on the bottom next to the cable route, and electronic intelligence specialists made sure that it was functioning normally and was intercepting intelligence information. “Helibat” was in the area for more than a week and only then headed to its home base on the islands of Guam, in order to return again to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk a month later to collect accumulated information.

At the final stage of the voyage, when the divers began work to remove cassettes with recordings from the “cocoon,” the unexpected happened. Well, it couldn’t be that such a risky and extremely complex operation would go so smoothly over a long period. A storm broke out in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. The excitement on the surface of the sea was so great that the Helibat, located at a considerable depth, was thrown up and down. As a result, the anchor chains could not withstand the tension and burst, and the boat began to float to the surface, but since the divers working at the bottom with the “cocoon” were connected by hoses to the hull of the submarine, it dragged them up with it. Such a sudden change in depth is detrimental for divers; it can lead to decompression sickness. Only thanks to the vigilance of the submarine's watch service was the ascent stopped in a timely manner, the divers were placed in a decompression chamber and thereby saved.

The information delivered by Helibat to the continent was again extremely highly appreciated by NSA specialists. It contained data on operational and tactical plans for the use of missile submarines, the problems of their maintenance and combat training, measures to reduce noise, the time of arrival and departure of crews for combat service, the political and moral state of personnel, etc. At the same time, the hopes of American intelligence officers to obtain the information they needed about the results of launches of sea- and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in the Kamchatka and Okhotsk Sea areas were not realized. But in general, in the relevant intelligence circles of the US Navy and NSA, this source of information was unofficially called a “gold mine.”

Trips to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk to listen to cable communications have become regular. The NSA even assigned the code name “Ivy Bells” to these operations. Mistakes were taken into account and conclusions were drawn from past lessons. The Bell company received orders to further improve the listening device. And the submarine "Helibat" in 1974 and 1975 made trips to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk with special devices on the hull such as skis - "skegs", which allowed it to land softly on the ground and not resort to the help of anchors.

Replaced by "Seawolf"

At the end of 1975, the Helibat submarine, having served its required term, was withdrawn from the fleet due to age. But, nevertheless, Operation Bindweed, due to its extreme importance and effectiveness, should not have been interrupted. The leadership of the US Navy decided to involve the nuclear submarine Seawolf to participate in the operation. At that time, Seawolf was not the most modern boat; it had been operating as part of the Navy for about 20 years, and since 1968 it was used only as a research boat. Therefore, its nuclear power plant and much of its equipment were relatively outdated. However, despite this, significant funds were allocated for its modernization in the interests of conducting operations to listen to underwater cable communication lines.

In 1976 and 1977, Seawolf made two trips under the Operation Bindweed plan to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. At the same time, the submarine crew faced two significant problems.

Seawolf submarine

The first was associated with the high noise level of the boat, because it was built, as already noted, at the dawn of nuclear submarine shipbuilding. American experts recognized it as one of the noisiest submarines in the US Navy. The Navy leadership took unprecedented measures to ensure the secrecy of navigation and the inadmissibility of detection by Soviet anti-submarine forces, given the special sensitivity of the Seawolf mission in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. As a rule, it was covered by at least two nuclear submarines. One, in her interests, searched for enemy anti-submarine forces on the approaches to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, and the second checked whether the Seawolf was being tracked by a Soviet submarine. If necessary, the second boat was supposed to distract the tracking Soviet submarine and lead it away.

The second group of problems was associated with the significant service life of the Seawolf equipment and, accordingly, the low technical reliability of its equipment. During the voyage of the boat, there were frequent breakdowns of equipment, fires, and malfunctions in the air conditioning system on board and in the operation of the reactor. The crew faced especially big troubles when this happened directly while performing a task in the area where the Soviet submarine cable was located.

However, despite these difficulties, the Seawolf crew successfully coped with the complex tasks of navigation and delivered valuable intelligence data ashore.

From Okhotsk to Barents...

At the end of the 70s, American naval intelligence suggested a change in the Soviet concept of using naval strategic nuclear forces, which was associated with the entry into service of the USSR Navy of new Delta-class submarines with a missile firing range of about 8,000 kilometers. With such a range, Delta-class submarines could fire ballistic missiles from the Barents and other Arctic seas while under the cover of their forces, virtually beyond the reach of most American anti-submarine warfare systems. This circumstance greatly worried the American military-political leadership. There was an urgent need for intelligence data confirming changes in the views of the Soviet military command on the use of sea-based strategic nuclear forces, as well as information about the nature and tactics of the actions of Soviet submarines in new, unconventional areas for the Russians and Americans.

Leading US naval intelligence experts believed that the most complete and reliable information on these strategically important issues could be obtained primarily by listening to Soviet cable communication lines in the Barents Sea, on the coast of which the main bases of the Delta-class missile submarines were located.

There was another carefully hidden reason for the need to conduct such an intelligence operation. IN lately The American command began to be concerned about the increasing number of cases of Soviet submarines tracking American submarines and the appearance of Russian reconnaissance forces in the areas of NATO exercises even before the Allied Navy arrived there. There were also cases of Soviet reconnaissance ships appearing in the planned areas for the exercises, although they were canceled at the last moment. The American side was also very alarmed by the sharply changed emphasis in the construction of Soviet submarines from quantitative to qualitative characteristics. In particular, the Soviet side “suddenly” realized the critical role of submarine noise in dueling situations under water and began building fundamentally new multi-purpose boats of the “Victor III” type (project 671rtm), which were noisier than American ones. All this aroused suspicion and concern among the Americans: whether there was an information leak at the strategic level. Have the Russians revealed their closely guarded secrets of encoding information transmitted over communication lines? Or maybe carefully hidden Soviet agents are successfully operating in the “holy of holies” of the command and control bodies of the American armed forces? The answers to these questions could, to a certain extent, be obtained by tapping those Russian communications lines that they believed the opposing side could not access.

These circumstances predetermined the need for a top-secret meeting, which took place in the “situation” room of the White House under the chairmanship of US President Carter in the spring of 1978. In addition to the leadership of American naval intelligence, led by its chief, Rear Admiral Inman, who reported on the essence of the problem, it was also attended by Vice President Mondale, Chief of Staff Jordan, Secretary of State Vance, CIA Director Turner, and Secretary of Defense Brown. Carter listened with great interest to the reports of intelligence specialists and approved their plans to conduct an intelligence operation in the Barents Sea related to listening to an underwater cable communication line.

Thus, the next stage of Operation Bindweed was launched in a completely different region, where the risk in its implementation was disproportionately higher. Considering the intensive activity of Soviet anti-submarine forces in this area, the expected need to enter not only the 12-mile zone of Soviet territorial waters, but also the internationally recognized 3-mile waters, the Helibat and Seawolf submarines would not be able to successfully cope with the task tasks due to its age and high noise level. It was necessary to attract a submarine of one of the latest projects with high tactical and technical characteristics, equipped with the most modern reconnaissance equipment. The choice of the American command fell on the nuclear submarine "Purch". It was one of the newest Sturgeon-class submarines at the time, nine of which were specially built to perform reconnaissance missions. By the way, among them, for example, were the submarines "Archerfish", "W. Bates" and "Batfish", which repeatedly received various awards and prizes for successfully solving reconnaissance tasks off the Soviet sea coast. The submarine "Purch", in addition to the reconnaissance equipment already available on it, was equipped for its new mission with special equipment for the installation and maintenance of modernized listening devices.

However, “Purch” made its first reconnaissance trip not to the Barents Sea, but to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. This was necessary to ensure that the boat’s crew received the necessary practice in solving risky and responsible tasks, as well as to test the reliability and effectiveness of reconnaissance equipment. The submarine successfully completed the task, gaining the required experience before the next, immeasurably more risky event.

"Purch" opens a new route

There was one serious limitation that affected the next voyage of the submarine Purchase. Its entry into the sea could only take place after the completion of Soviet-American negotiations at the highest level on the limitation of strategic arms. After all, the slightest mistake in completing the task could have a very serious impact on Soviet-American relations. Finally, on June 18, 1979, SALT II was signed by US President Carter and Secretary General Central Committee of the CPSU Brezhnev. The path to the Barents Sea was open for "Purch".

Given the particular delicacy and riskiness of the upcoming mission, a very unusual route was chosen for the Purchase to the destination area. From its home base at Mare Island, it would proceed north of San Francisco, then past Alaska through the shallow Bering Strait and through the North Pole into the Barents Sea. As American experts assumed, it was precisely this route that was supposed to ensure the greatest secrecy of the submarine’s actions.

Submarine "Perch"

Unprecedented secrecy measures were taken for Purchase, even more stringent than for Helibat and Seawolf. The overwhelming majority of the Purchase crew believed that the main task of the boat was to develop a new route for submarines in the Barents Sea to conduct anti-submarine operations there. The boat was equipped with a special room in the torpedo compartment for a special group of increased strength, designed to conduct electronic reconnaissance and ensure the use of a listening device. Therefore, the supply of torpedoes on the boat was extremely reduced: only four torpedoes were left for self-defense in case of unforeseen circumstances. Taking into account the same circumstances, 70 kilograms of explosives for self-detonation were placed on board the boat, just like earlier on the Helibat and Seawolf. The submarine, like some others of the Sturgeon class used for reconnaissance purposes, was equipped to navigate in ice conditions.

Only at the end of August 1979, the submarine "Purch" left its home base and headed for the Barents Sea. Particularly difficult in carrying out this task was not only the unusual route of passage (especially through the Bering Strait), but also the search for a Soviet submarine cable in vast areas off the coast, in conditions of intense shipping and enemy anti-submarine activity. It was initially assumed that the cable communication line should run from the Kola Bay along the coast of the peninsula to the White Sea, where the largest center for the construction and repair of Soviet submarines in the North was located. Taking this into account, the boat commander decided to concentrate the main efforts to search for the cable at the exit from the White Sea, where the likelihood of it running was greatest.

Finally, using previously proven technologies, the underwater cable was discovered, and a listening device was installed on the bottom next to it. For two weeks, the submarine remained in the area of ​​the cable, since the electronic intelligence specialists on board needed to make sure that the “cocoon” was functioning properly, carefully analyze the information passing through the cable, and select the most informative channels. And only after this could “Purch” leave the destination area and report to management about the completion of the mission. Due to the extreme secrecy of the mission, the signal about its completion was transmitted not on the usual radio frequencies for American submarines, but on those used by the Soviets in order to reduce the likelihood of its radio interception by Soviet intelligence. After this, the signal about the completion of the operation was also transmitted to the second American boat, which supported the operations of the Purchase and was mainly intended to distract Soviet anti-submarine forces.

The results of the mission carried out by the submarine "Purch" were considered very successful. Given their special significance, the crew of the submarine was thanked by a special decree of the US President. It, in particular, noted the “exceptional heroism and outstanding success of the submarine’s personnel in performing a special mission of extreme importance to the national security of the United States..” Each crew member was solemnly presented with a personalized certificate with the specified text, certified by the seal of the President of the United States and signed personally by Carter.

"Cocoons" discovered

At the beginning of 1980, according to the plan, "Purch" was supposed to make a trip to the Barents Sea to collect intelligence information from a listening device, and "Seawolf" - to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. However, the unexpected happened: while practicing pre-cruise training tasks at sea on the Seawolf, a fire occurred. The submarine was docked for repairs, and "Purch" after returning from a cruise in the summer, is heading to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. At the same time, it also enters the Barents Sea to install another “cocoon”.

With the coming to power of the new President Reagan in the United States, the results and plans of the most important intelligence operations abroad were reported to him for approval. Among these top-priority and secret operations were reconnaissance activities of American submarines off the coast of the USSR. In March 1981, President Reagan heard from the new head of the Naval Intelligence Agency, Rear Admiral Butts, on this issue. And this time, the meeting in the “situation” room of the White House, given its special importance, was attended by the most influential political and military figures of the state: Vice President Bush, Assistant to the President for National Security Allen, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Baker, Secretary of the Navy Lemon, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff Watkins. Reagan was very interested in reports from the leadership of the US Navy about the growing power of the Soviet Navy and the importance of submarine reconnaissance operations in Russian coastal waters. He unconditionally supported them and gave complete carte blanche to the next stage of their implementation.

The Navy command, supported in its aspirations by the highest military-political leadership of the state, envisaged already in 1981 simultaneously sending two special-purpose submarines according to the Operation Bindweed plan to the Barents and Okhotsk Seas. But if "Purch" successfully completed the assigned task this time, then "Seawolf", as if justifying its eternal bad luck, faced serious problems in its implementation. So, while in the destination area, the commander of the submarine did not maneuver very successfully when landing on the ground, and the boat with its “skegs” fell on the underwater cable, which presumably could have led to its damage. And this, in turn, could force the Soviet side to check the serviceability of the cable and lead to the discovery of a listening device. In addition, the storm that broke out, like last time, almost led to the death of the divers. When surfacing, the submarine with great difficulty lifted itself off the ground and escaped from the “sandy captivity”, since its “skegs” were covered with a significant layer of sand. Sand also penetrated into most of the ship's onboard systems and mechanisms, which significantly hampered their operation, causing serious problems with the operation of the reactor. Finally, upon returning to base, the submarine could possibly have been detected by a Soviet surface ship.

The fact that the Seawolf submarine crashed onto a Soviet submarine cable seriously worried the leadership of American naval intelligence. After all, this could lead to the failure of the entire Operation Bindweed.

And soon what the Americans feared so much happened. In one of the photographs obtained with the help of space reconnaissance, American experts discovered a large concentration of Soviet ships in precisely the area of ​​the Sea of ​​Okhotsk where the listening devices were located. One of the ships was equipped with deep-sea equipment. As American intelligence later established, both devices were recovered from the bottom. Moreover, the Soviet side had no doubt who they belonged to, since a sign “Property of the US Government” was found on one of them.

But why did this happen? Did the unsuccessful actions of Seawolf really lead to the failure of Operation Bindweed in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk? The US Navy Intelligence Agency carefully analyzed all available information on this issue. As a result, a top-secret report was drawn up, access to which was extremely limited. It ruled out the possibility of mere coincidence or luck on the part of the Russians: they knew what they were doing and were going exactly to the location of the recording device. The version that the Seawolf submarine was involved in its discovery was also excluded. She fell on the cable at a time when the Soviet ship with deep-sea equipment had long been heading into the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. Consequently, it was concluded that the most likely reason for the failure of the operation was an information leak, that is, there was a Soviet agent in certain US military-political circles admitted to this topic. But who he was, the Americans were unable to establish for four years, until 1985. However, this will be discussed below.

At the same time, there is another version of the failure of Operation Bindweed in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. According to the command of the Pacific Fleet, the root cause of the discovery of the American “cocoon” was an accidental break of the cable by a trawl while fishing on Soviet vessels in that area. A special cable vessel was sent to the supposed location of the cable damage, which, when searching for a break in the cable, found a large container of unknown purpose at the bottom. The container was lifted aboard the ship, and then delivered to the base and transported further to Moscow to determine its purpose and ownership. KGB experts and Navy specialists gave an unequivocal conclusion: the found container was a high-tech automated listening device made in the USA40.

It is not possible to say in this book which of the proposed versions lies the truth. The special services of both the USA and the USSR have always kept their secrets extremely carefully, especially if it was related to the activities of human intelligence.

But be that as it may, the Soviet leadership became aware of the wiretapping of communications on a submarine cable communication line that was considered inaccessible. Based on this, the American command at that time was faced with a dilemma: if Operation Bindweed in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk failed, does this mean that an installation of a listening device on a Soviet cable was discovered in the Barents Sea. Is it possible to send the submarine "Purch" to collect intelligence information to the coast of the Kola Peninsula?

They don’t give up on the “gold mine”

Despite the enormous risk, the US Navy command could not refuse such an extremely valuable source of information as an underwater communication line in the Barents Sea - the region where the most powerful group of sea-based strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union operated. The decision was made: "Perch" will be sent to retrieve information from the listening device. However, it was necessary to take extreme precautions to completely prevent its detection.

The indicated area was constantly monitored by all components of the US Armed Forces intelligence system. However, nothing unusual was noted in the activities of the Northern Fleet forces during this period. But maybe, given the intense shipping in this area, unlike the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk, the opposing side, under its cover, has already managed to organize some kind of countermeasures? Taking this into account, the idea arose to send the "Purch" to the destination area along a completely unthinkable route. One that the opposing side cannot possibly assume. And such an unusual path was chosen. It envisaged that the submarine would proceed along the Pacific coast of the United States, cross the equator, pass along South America, go around Cape Horn and the Falkland Islands from the south, cross the entire Atlantic and enter the Barents Sea from the south-west. The departure from the base point was planned for April 1982, it was assumed that the duration of the trip would be about five months, and the distance traveled would be about 15,000 miles.

While in the destination area, the submarine, in the interests of ensuring secrecy, reduced the time it spent above the cable to the limit. A new modification of the “cocoon” was installed, which has a self-destruct device in case it rises to the surface. It also provided for an increased capacity of recording equipment, since it was previously assumed that “Purch” would be able to return to record information the next time only in two years due to the need to put it in for repairs.

For this campaign, which ended successfully, the submarine crew was commended in a decree of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President of the United States. The personalized certificate awarded to each crew member, in addition to the traditional phrases already mentioned earlier, noted “outstanding achievements in the duration and efficiency of underwater operations.” In addition, President Reagan personally presented the submarine commander with a box of cigars in honor of the success of this mission.

It so happened that in 1983, not a single submarine from the US Navy could be sent to the Barents Sea to retrieve information from the listening device. "Purch" was under repair for a year. Seawolf was also docked, recovering from damage sustained on her last voyage. Based on previous results, it was decided not to use it any longer according to the Operation Bindweed plan, but to limit ourselves to only attracting sunken fragments of missile weapons and equipment to the recovery from the seabed. Taking into account the current situation, the US Navy command planned to re-equip the fourth submarine for special operations. It was the Sturgeon-class nuclear attack submarine Richard Russell.

After completion of repairs in 1984, the submarine "Purch" made its fifth trip to the Barents Sea. Over the past time, significant changes have occurred in the military-political situation in the world, in the highest military-political leadership of the USSR and its military doctrine. Therefore, the information that Purchase delivered after its return earned a very flattering assessment from the National Security Agency and the Navy Intelligence Agency. In particular, it contained information about the control system of Soviet strategic missile submarines, their levels of combat readiness, and views on their use in various environmental conditions. American leaders received very valuable information for them that missile submarines are not planned to be used as a means of delivering a first nuclear missile strike, but are intended to be used as a strategic reserve. Information was also received about the organization of so-called “protected areas” of combat operations (“bastions”) of missile submarines and other very interesting information.

Traitors in the "orderly" ranks

At the beginning of 1985, the US Navy intelligence department received a message from the FBI, which could seriously affect the possibility of further reconnaissance operations of American submarines in the coastal waters of the USSR, including wiretapping cable communication lines.

The FBI has identified Walker, a former liaison officer at Submarine Command Atlantic, as a Soviet agent. Beginning in 1968, he transferred to the USSR KGB information about encryption technology and information encoding systems, photocopies of secret documents and cipher materials from the headquarters of the submarine forces in Norfolk. In particular, as naval intelligence experts determined, it was thanks to this information that the Soviet command in many cases knew exactly where American submarines were patrolling. Also, thanks to Walker, Soviet boats used the latest American technical achievements to reduce their noise. The leadership of the US Navy was very depressed by the paradoxical situation that the Soviets, having spent a total of only about a million dollars on paying the work of one of their agents, thereby managed to reduce to virtually nothing the US advantages in the underwater confrontation that they had been trying to conquer for decades. And this despite billions of dollars spent on scientific research, development and successful intelligence operations, including wiretapping communication lines, risking hundreds of lives of American sailors.

The gloomy assumptions made by intelligence experts in the late 70s and early 80s about the presence of Soviet agents in the highest command of the American armed forces have come true.

Even more stunning news came to Navy intelligence at the end of the same year: US National Security Agency employee Pelton was arrested, who, as the FBI established, had transferred a large amount of classified material to the Soviet side, including on Operation Bindweed. Pelton sold the KGB information about tapping an undersea cable communication line off the coast of Kamchatka for $35,000. Much has now become clear to the American military command from the unclear situation that developed in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk in 1981. However, an investigation by the Naval Intelligence Agency showed that Pelton did not have access to data on the activities of American submarines under the Operation Bindweed plan in the Barents Sea, much less in other areas of the World Ocean41.

Here we should especially dwell on the fate of Pelton, who played a fatal role in this intelligence operation that continued so successfully for a number of years.

Ronald Pelton was a staff member of the NSA from 1964 to 1979. As a specialist fluent in Russian, he worked in one of the agency's divisions, which was engaged in deciphering recordings of conversations between Soviet military and civilian officials intercepted using electronic intelligence. IN recent years During his work at the agency, Pelton often had to listen to tapes of a fundamentally new nature. As he suggested, they were received by connecting to some wire communication line of the Russians in the Far East, since the negotiations concerned exclusively the peninsula with the similar Indian name Kamchatka. Obviously, conversations were also carried out over the same cable using classified communication equipment, because Pelton happened to translate open technical exchanges between operators before they turned on special encryptors. Kamchatka films, which was remarkable, arrived every 3-4 months, and then a huge wave of information for translation literally overwhelmed the employees of his department.

In the meantime, Pelton was engaged in this work along with other important tasks, without attaching any special importance to it. He had no idea that later meeting her would literally make him rich. This continued until 1979, when Pelton failed his annual polygraph test - a "lie detector". Previously, he had always carefully prepared for them, but this time it was organized unexpectedly. It revealed his homosexual inclinations, and such employees were not kept in the agency. Pelton had to resign, but he harbored a sense of revenge against the organization, which, instantly forgetting his merits, threw him out onto the street without a livelihood.

Out of a sense of revenge and, obviously, for financial reasons, Pelton decided to contact the Soviet embassy, ​​where he offered his services as a former NSA employee who had access to top-secret information, and also retained good connections in this organization. For almost six years before his arrest in November 1985, he provided Soviet intelligence with detailed information about the activities and elements of the NSA security system in the seventies. Pelton gave information about several strategically important American electronic intelligence data collection systems, including Operation Bindweed. He conveyed all the information that was related to listening to the “Kamchatka” tapes that he remembered so well, and also supplemented it with his own conclusion: American intelligence was listening to some cable communication line in the Far East and, possibly, deciphering messages transmitted through it. Establishing what kind of communication line this was, presumably, did not pose much difficulty for Soviet intelligence. But when taking measures to prevent further leaks of information, the Soviet side had to provide for an operation to cover Pelton. The Americans should under no circumstances have guessed from what source the information about Operation Bindweed was received. Perhaps one of the activities to cover up Pelton was the spread of rumors, and subsequently the publication in the Soviet press of information about the break of a communication cable in the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk by fishermen and about the “accidental discovery” of an American listening device there?

The American side was busy with something else during this period.

The military-political leadership of the US armed forces was very concerned about the possibility of further leaks of information about this operation at Pelton's trial and through the media. Unprecedented pressure was put on Pelton himself, judges, lawyers, owners of publishing houses and magazines to prevent this from happening. So, when, at one of the closed court hearings, Pelton's lawyer only mentioned the code name "Ivy Bells", the judge stopped the questioning, prohibiting further proceedings in the case. CIA Director Casey repeatedly threatened the owners of a number of American newspapers with prosecution for divulging state secrets if information about this operation was published. The owner of one of the most popular American newspapers, The Washington Post, received a personal call from US President Reagan with an urgent request not to publish an article about Pelton in it, as this “could harm the national security of the country”42.

"Manta" comes to replace

Given the events that took place, the National Security Agency and the US Navy took emergency measures to tighten the secrecy regime. The code name "Boundweed" ("Ivy Bells") would never be used again; the term "Manta" began to be used to refer to submarine reconnaissance operations in general, and "Acetone" to operations for tapping underwater cable communication lines. But these conventional names subsequently began to change several times.

In an atmosphere of unusually heightened secrecy and with comprehensive precautions, the submarine "Purch" was sent back to the Barents Sea in early September 1986 along the Arctic route. This was the boat's seventh trip to this region. However, when the submarine was almost on the border of the 12-mile territorial waters of the Soviet Union, a coded telegram suddenly arrived from Washington, prohibiting it from entering these waters and ordering it to wait for further instructions. The fact is that on September 19, USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze handed over a letter from Gorbachev to US President Reagan with a proposal to hold a summit meeting to discuss strategic arms limitation issues. And such a meeting between the two leaders was scheduled for October 11, 1986. Naturally, under such conditions, the military-political leadership of the United States in no way wanted to in any way, literally on the eve of this meeting, complicate relations with the USSR. If the submarine "Purch" was discovered in the territorial waters of the Soviet Union, this would inevitably happen.

For about a month, the submarine remained in a holding area close to the point where the main mission was performed, without entering territorial waters. Over such a long period of time, the risk of being discovered increased immeasurably. The crew members, who had all the information about the true mission of the submarine, clearly understood the danger of the current situation. If the boat is discovered when entering Soviet territorial waters, it will inevitably either be destroyed by the enemy, or, if there is a threat of its capture, blown up by the American crew itself. But in all cases, the American leadership will completely deny its involvement in what happened.

Like a soldier in a trench before the decisive moment of attack, the nuclear submarine "Purch" froze at the border of the territorial waters of the USSR in the Barents Sea, waiting for a short command "Forward!" to pick up the "cocoon" and carry out the necessary operations on the secret Soviet communications cable. Expired last days before the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting in Reykjavik, and any mistake in the actions of Purchase could lead to the breakdown of negotiations between them.

But finally the submarine received a signal allowing it to enter territorial waters. Divers from the "Purch" replaced one of the listening devices and removed cassette tapes from another. The assigned task was completed, the corresponding signals were transmitted to the supporting nuclear submarine Finback and to Washington. After returning to base, the crew of the "Purch" was noted in the next decree of the US President. Given the extraordinary circumstances in which this campaign was carried out and the task was brilliantly accomplished, President Reagan wished to meet personally with the submarine commander Buchanan and express his gratitude to him for his significant contribution to strengthening the national security of the United States.

In 1987, the Seawolf submarine was decommissioned from the Navy, and the Purchase began conversion to a dock, during which it was planned to additionally cut into its hull a 30-meter section with improved equipment for servicing listening devices and raising sunken equipment. For several years, while the re-equipment of the "Purch" lasted, it was to be replaced by the nuclear submarine "Richard Russell". She has repeatedly, since 1987, made trips to the Barents Sea under both US President Reagan and President Bush. She also carried out a secret mission in the northern part of the Norwegian Sea, when President Bush offered Gorbachev assistance in raising the sunken Soviet nuclear submarine Komsomolets. She continued her intelligence activities under President Clinton until 1993, when she was withdrawn from combat service.

From that moment on, it was replaced by the refurbished nuclear submarine USS Purchase, which again received awards from the US President in 1995, 1996 and 1997 for the successful solution of special tasks. At the same time, the most modern underwater technologies were used to carry them out, including remotely controlled robotic long-range vehicles, which minimized the risk to human lives. After 2002, it should be replaced by the Jimmy Carter nuclear submarine, the third Seawolf-class submarine. Unlike previous submarines in the series, it is planned to install an additional section of a double-hull structure (the so-called “wasp waist”) 14 meters long on the Jimmy Carter boat. The durable building will house premises for electronic intelligence specialists of the Navy and NSA or for special operations forces personnel. The inter-hull space will serve to accommodate various reconnaissance equipment, including those intended for listening to underwater cable communication lines, promising means of delivering combat swimmers, equipment for lifting sunken objects, etc.

In the early 90s, with a radical change in the geopolitical situation in the world and the adoption of new military doctrinal guidelines, the United States began to extend the reconnaissance activities of its submarines to other regions of the World Ocean, where, as they believe, their “vital” interests could be affected . The coastal waters of Iran, China, North Korea, and the countries of the Arab world (especially Iraq and Libya) became the areas of their close attention. It is quite obvious that when carrying out such reconnaissance operations, it was not possible to do without listening to the underwater cable communication lines of the indicated, and perhaps other, states. Thus, it has been reliably established that in 1985, the nuclear submarine Seawolf, together with a specially built midget submarine NR-1, carried out a reconnaissance operation in the Mediterranean Sea to listen to Libyan underwater communication cables.

The pathological desire of the military-political leadership of the United States to keep under close control any undesirable, and in some cases even favorable, governments of other countries in the world leaves no doubt about its constancy. This is confirmed by the grandiose projects of the US Armed Forces command to connect listening devices with coastal terminals in Japan and Greenland using long-distance fiber-optic cables in order to receive intelligence information not by periodically picking it up by submarines, but in almost real time. If one of these projects was successful, it was planned to extend similar practices to other regions of the World Ocean that were of interest to the American side. However, due to the significant costs of their implementation (more than a billion dollars), the US Congress did not approve these projects. But over the past decades, scientific thought and production have made great strides forward. At present and in the future, virtually any coastal state in the world has no guarantee that no less ambitious, but technically more advanced and less expensive American reconnaissance projects have already been implemented or can be implemented in their territorial waters.

E A Baykov, G L Zykov

From the book “Secrets of Underwater Espionage”

A topographic map on which the tactical or special situation with all its changes during combat operations is graphically displayed using conventional tactical signs with the necessary explanatory inscriptions is called the commander’s working map.

The process of displaying a tactical or special situation on a map or other graphic document is called “drawing the situation.” The set of conventional tactical signs is called “tactical situation” or “situation” for short.

Completeness of application of the situation:

1. About the enemy:

• location of weapons of mass destruction with detail down to an individual weapon or missile launcher;
• infantry, motorized infantry, tank, artillery units with details down to platoon, gun;
• radiation situation to the extent necessary for work.

2.About your troops:

• the position of units with detail two levels below their level (for example, the regiment commander applies the signs of battalions and companies).
• tasks assigned by the senior manager.

Applicable topographic maps:

• 1:25000 - commanders of units and companies;
• 1:50000 - battalion commanders;
• 1:100000 - commanders of regiments, divisions, corps;
• 1:200000 - commanders of armies, fronts;
• 1:500000 - overview maps of the fronts, the main command.

The following colors are used to apply the furnishings:

1. Basic - red, blue, black;
2. Auxiliary - brown, green, yellow.

The use of other colors, as well as shades of primary or secondary colors, is not permitted.

• RED used to designate for our troops the position, tasks, actions, weapons and equipment of motorized rifle, airborne, tank, aviation, and naval units. The same color indicates fire zones, regardless of who created these zones.
• BLUE used to designate for enemy troops the position, tasks, actions, weapons and equipment of all types of troops. Also, all inscriptions related to the enemy are written in this color. The same color indicates flood zones, regardless of who created these zones.
• BLACK used in designation for our troops positions, tasks, actions, weapons and equipment of the missile forces, artillery, anti-aircraft troops, engineering troops, chemical troops, radio engineering troops, communications troops, railway and other special troops. Also, all inscriptions relating to all branches of our troops are made in this color.
• BROWN used for drawing roads, routes, column tracks of our troops, filling zones of use of bacteriological (biological) weapons, marking the outer border of the radioactive contamination zone V.
• GREEN used to mark the outer boundary of the radioactive contamination zone B.
• YELLOW used to fill the zone of chemical contamination.

All inscriptions are made in straight or oblique standard drawing font. Straight font is used for the map title and official signatures. In other cases, italic font is used (inclination angle 75 degrees). Italic capital letters are used for official headings and signatures, as well as at the beginning of sentences and for abbreviations. Lowercase letters are used to write legends, explanatory notes and a large number of abbreviations. All inscriptions are made only horizontally. Vertical or slanted lettering is not permitted.

The size of the inscriptions should be proportional to the scale of the map and commensurate with the significance of the unit. The table shows the sizes of the inscriptions depending on the scale of the map and the unit (life-size shoif size). The font size for designating smaller units, individual objects, and explanatory inscriptions cannot be larger than the font size for the platoon.

Drawings of tactical signs of our troops are always directed towards the enemy and vice versa. The exception is anti-aircraft weapons, which are always directed towards the top edge of the map.

If the tactical sign is clearly larger in size than the true size of the object on the map scale, then the location of the object on the ground is considered to be the center of the tactical sign (for flags, the lower part of the flag stem, for arrows, the front end of the arrow).

Control rooms and communications

The regiment control center is in place. The inscription KP means command post, TPU means rear control post. The inscription inside the flag is the regiment number.

Battalion control center. The inscription 1/10 MSP means 1 battalion of the 10th motorized rifle regiment.

The same is true in motion.

1- The company commander’s command and observation post is in place. 2- BMP of the company commander (accordingly designated as an armored personnel carrier, the tank of the company commander. The tactical sign of this type of equipment and two dashes are placed. The platoon commander has one dash.

Observation point of the 10th motorized rifle regiment. If there is a letter inside the sign, this means that the NP is specialized (A-artillery, I-engineering, X-chemical, B-air surveillance, T-technical). In artillery and special forces the badge is black.

Traffic control post (P-regulator, checkpoint-checkpoint, KTP-control-technical point.

Communication center. 1- field mobile. 2- stationary

Radio. 305 - brand of receiver.

Radio station. 1-movable, 2-wearable. 3-tank

Mobile radio relay station

Radar reconnaissance station. 1- air targets. 2 ground targets.

Radio network of portable stations.

Radio direction of mobile stations.

March, reconnaissance and security

1-Pedestrian column of troops. A regiment with a number designation, a battalion with three lines, a company with two lines, a platoon with one line, a squad without lines.

2. Column of troops on equipment. There are 2 MSRs on BMPs here. if there is a tank column, then the tank icon, if there is an armored personnel carrier column, then the armored personnel carrier icon, etc.

1- Column of special troops. Here is the fifth engineer battalion.

2-Column of an artillery battalion (battery - two dashes, platoon - one dash, separate gun on the march - the arrow is shorter and without dashes

The head marching outpost consisting of the first motorized rifle company on an infantry fighting vehicle, reinforced by the first platoon of the second tank company (BPZ - side marching outpost, TPZ - rear.

Mobile obstacle detachment of the tenth motorized rifle regiment.

Column of a logistics support platoon (vob), if the company is mated. support then the inscription - rmob, battalion mob

Column of the technical closure of the battalion (P-regiment).

Reconnaissance squad.

Patrol squad on an infantry fighting vehicle

Combat reconnaissance patrol of the 2nd tank battalion by 9.00 on November 15. (ORD-separate reconnaissance patrol, RD - reconnaissance patrol, OFRD - officer reconnaissance patrol, IRD-engineer reconnaissance patrol, KRD - chemical reconnaissance patrol), Color of the badge by branch of the military.

Foot patrol.

Foot patrol of the 7th tank company and its patrol route

1 platoon of reconnaissance company of the 10th motorized rifle regiment in search (raid)

1st platoon of the 9th tank company in an ambush.

Location and actions of units

The area (section of terrain) occupied by the unit. There are 3 motorized rifle battalions here. The inscription indicating the unit is required, the tactical sign of the unit's equipment is optional. The sign is large-scale; on the map it covers the entire area occupied by the unit. A broken line indicates that the area is slated for occupation by the unit. The letter "L" indicates that this is a false area.

An area occupied by a unit whose tactical color is black. This is the area of ​​the 5th engineer battalion.

The direction of the unit's advance.

The unit's immediate task. Here 1 - general sign-battalion (as indicated by three dashes on the arrow), 2nd battalion on an infantry fighting vehicle. If the battalion or company, or platoon is tank, then tank badges, if on an armored personnel carrier, then armored personnel carrier badges, if the battalion is on foot, then sign No. 1 is used. The sign is large-scale!

Follow up task. Here 1 is the general badge of the battalion, 2 is the badge of the tank battalion. The sign is large!

The position (milestone) reached by a unit by a certain time. The sign is large.

A machine gun platoon in battle formation. Below is the general sign of the battalion and company on an infantry fighting vehicle. The sign is large.

The line of probable meeting with the enemy.

Initial line (regulatory line, line of entry into battle of the second echelon, etc. lines

Front (line) occupied by units. Line of contact with the enemy

Deployment line in battalion columns (company - two lines, platoon - one line)

Line of transition to attack. 1 general sign, 2 motorized rifle units.

Dismounting line for motorized rifle units

Firing line of a tank unit. Here is the third firing line of the third tank battalion.

Anti-tank unit deployment line

Mining frontier.

Tactical airborne landing area. Here is the second battalion of the third motorized rifle regiment. disembarkation is expected at 9.00 on July 10. If the landing has taken place, then the line is solid.

Helicopter landing area.

Naval landing site and points.

The unit was stopped at this point.

The unit's withdrawal from the occupied line.

Demarcation line between shelves

dividing line between battalions.

A line (position) not occupied by units.

The location of the unit in defense.

1 - general badge, 2 - motorized rifle unit.

The place where the prisoner was captured. Here a soldier of the second battalion of the 26th infantry regiment of the 19th mechanized division was captured at 5.00 on August 12.

The place where the documents of the murdered person were seized.

Weapons of mass destruction and protection against them

Our planned nuclear strike. 015 - target number, 1/5 order - first battery of the fifth cancer division. -40 - ammunition power 40 kilotons, B - air explosion. "H+1.10 - explosion time.

Safe removal line (protrusions towards the explosion).

An area of ​​destruction from an enemy explosion. The inner ring is a zone of complete destruction, then a zone of continuous rubble and weak destruction; The outer ring is a zone of neutron influence on openly located personnel.

Fire area and direction of fire spread.

The location of a nuclear explosion carried out by the enemy, indicating the type of explosion, power and time, and the zone of radioactive contamination. The direction and sizes of the zones are large-scale

Radiation level measuring point with level indication. time and date of infection.

Enemy nuclear mine with indication of charge power, laying depth and detection time.

Field of chemical landmines.

The area contaminated with toxic substances and the direction of displacement of the agent cloud.

Biological weapons contamination site.

Small arms and artillery

Light machine gun

Heavy machine gun

Anti-tank hand grenade launcher

Automatic grenade launcher

Anti-aircraft missile system.

Anti-aircraft machine gun installation

Easel anti-tank grenade launcher

Man-portable anti-tank missile systems (ATGM). Here is 1 - ATGM of an anti-tank machine gun platoon, 2 - ATGM of an anti-tank platoon.

Flamethrowers. Here 1-reactive light, 2-reactive heavy.

Anti-tank gun. 1 - general designation, 2 - up to 85 mm, 3 - up to 100 mm, 4 - more than 100 mm.

Gun. 1 - general designation, 2 - up to 100 mm, 3 - up to 152 mm, 4 - more than 152 mm.

Howitzer. 1 - general designation, 2 - up to 122 mm, 3 - up to 155 mm, 4 - more than 155 mm.

Howitzer with a caliber of over 155mm, firing nuclear ammunition.

Self-propelled howitzer. Here the caliber is up to 122 mm.

Rocket artillery combat vehicle. 1-general designation. 2 - medium caliber.

Mortar. 1 - general designation, 2 - small caliber, 3 - medium caliber, 4 - large caliber.

Anti-aircraft gun. 1-general designation. 2-small caliber, 3-medium caliber.

Anti-aircraft self-propelled gun. 1 - without radar, 2 - with radar.

Anti-aircraft missile system combat vehicle. The style of the sign depends on the type of base vehicle, the icon inside depends on the type of rocket.

Anti-aircraft missile launcher. 1-short range. 2-short range, 3-medium range. The sign in the circle is the Zen.PU battery.

Area of ​​artillery division firing positions. Here is the first division of the 12th artillery regiment. Battery signs are out-of-scale, area-scale.

Battery firing position 100mm. guns.

Mortar battery firing position

A separate goal. 28 is the target number. The blue sign inside the circle is the location of the enemy fire weapon.

Fire concentration areas. Numbers are CO numbers. The signs are large.

A single stationary barrage light indicating its conventional name.

Deep, stationary barrage fire on three lines indicating the code name Co and line numbers.

Single moving barrage light indicating its conventional name and line numbers.

Double moving barrage fire

Sequential concentration of fire indicating the conventional names of the lines and target numbers (solid lines are the lines at which it is planned to fire simultaneously; with double PSO, solid lines connect targets on two lines, with triple on three. Lines and areas of targets are large-scale.

Massive fire indicating its conventional name and section numbers.

Fire shaft indicating the conventional names of lines, sections for divisions and their numbers, and numbers of intermediate lines.

Boundary line of the firing sector

Boundary line of the additional firing sector.

Concentrated fire from a motorized rifle company (SO-1 - section number, 1,2,3 - platoon section numbers.

The barrage line of a grenade launcher platoon with its number and sections of squad fires indicated.

Armored vehicles, cars and helicopters

Tank. 1 - general designation, 2 - battalion commander's tank, 3 - amphibious tank, 4 - flamethrower tank

A tank with a complex of anti-tank weapons.

Tank and infantry fighting vehicle with mine trawl

Tank with BTU

Tank with STU

Combat reconnaissance vehicle and combat reconnaissance patrol vehicle (BRDM)

Car and car with trailer

1-tank tractor, 2-track tractor, 3-car tractor

Motorbike

Sanitary vehicle

Helicopter. 1 - general designation, 2 - combat, 3 - transport.

Engineering equipment and structures

Tank bridge layer

Crawler floating conveyor

Crawler self-propelled ferry (ferry-bridge vehicle).

Engineering equipment on a wheel base (Here is a heavy mechanized bridge TMM)

Engineering equipment on a tracked base (here BAT).

Pontoon-bridge park with an indication of its type.

Trench of a motorized rifle unit with a closed gap

Trench with communication progress.

A gun in a trench. The color of the trench sign according to the type of troops. (same sign for all mobile fire weapons)

An open type observation structure (closed type with a black filled triangle.

Shelter for vehicles (vehicle icon by type)

Shelter indicating the degree of protection and capacity

Open gap

Covered gap

Scarp (counter-scarp) indicating the length.

Inconspicuous wire fence (spiral, net on low posts.

Anti-tank ditch indicating its length.

Notches indicating the type, number of rows and length.

Mined obstruction indicating its extent.

Wire fence (number of lines - number of rows).

section of hedgehog fences indicating the number of rows and length

Anti-tank minefield

Anti-personnel minefield (a mixed minefield is indicated by alternating filled and open circles)

Minefields installed by means of remote mining.

1-uncontrolled land mine, 2-radio-controlled land mine, 3-wire-controlled land mine.

Passage in barriers indicating the number and width.

Bridge destroyed by the enemy

A section of road destroyed by the enemy, indicating the extent of the destruction.

Landing crossing indicating the number and type of landing craft.

Crossing tanks under water indicating 3-depth, 180-width of the river, 40-width of the route, P-character of the bottom, 0.8-current speed.

Ferry crossing indicating the number of ferries, their capacity and type of fleet

Ferry crossing consisting of three GSP ferries and 3 ferries of 40 tons each and from PMM vehicles.

Bridge on rigid supports. H-low-water 120m long, 4m wide. and a lifting capacity of 60 tons.

Pontoon bridge 120m long, with a load capacity of 60 tons from the PMP park

The ford is 0.8 m deep, the river width is 120 m, the bottom is solid, the flow speed is 0.5 m per second.

Ice crossing number five for loads of 60 tons.

Technical support and logistics units and their facilities

Collection point for damaged vehicles. P-regimental, 1 - its number, bt - for armored vehicles

Repair and evacuation group on an armored personnel carrier. P-regimental, BT - for armored vehicles.

Regimental warehouse. G - fuel, 10tp - tenth tank regiment.

Regimental medical station.

Battalion medical center.

Company medical post

Shooter-medic.

Ambulance transport post

Battalion fuel and lubricant refueling point

Battalion supply point

Company ammunition supply point

Service point along the route. G-GSM.

Combined arms units and subdivisions

• Motorized rifle. regiment, battalion, company, platoon, squad - smp, sb, msr, msv, mso
• Tank regiment, battalion, company, platoon tp, tb, tr, tv
• Machine gun artillery battalion, company pullab, pular
• Parachute battalion, company, platoon pdb, pdr, pdv
• Airborne assault battalion, company, platoon dshb, dshr, dshv
• Reconnaissance company, platoon, section rr, rv, ro
• Machine gun company, platoon, squad - pull, pull, pullo
• Anti-tank platoon- PTV
• Grenade launcher platoon, squad- guards, th
• Anti-tank machine gun platoon ptpulv

Artillery units and units

• Artillery regiment, division, battery - ap, adn, batr
• Self-propelled artillery division, battery sadn, sabatr
• Battery of anti-tank guided missiles - batr ATGM
• Mortar battery, platoon- minbatr, minv
• Control platoon- woo

Air defense units and units

• Anti-aircraft missile battery, platoon, squad - zrbatr, zrv, zro
• Anti-aircraft artillery battery, platoon, squad - zabatr, manager, zo
• Anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery - earner
• Battery, platoon of anti-aircraft self-propelled guns - battalion ZSU, airborne ZSU

Special Forces Units

• Engineer-sapper company, platoon, squad- isr, isv, iso
• Engineer assault company, platoon, squad - ishr, ishv, isho
• Airborne transfer company- pdesr
• Pontoon company, platoon- Mon, Mon
• Platoon, squad of tracked floating transporters - up GPT, dept. GPT
• Platoon, squad of tracked self-propelled ferries - up GSP, dept. SHG
• Bridge laying department - dept. MTU
• Company, chemical defense platoon- rkhz, vkhz
• Platoon, radiation and chemical reconnaissance department - vrhr, orhr
• Platoon, special processing department - soo, oso
• Flamethrower platoon, squad- ov, oh
• Company, platoon, communications department - rs, sun, os
• Commandant's company, platoon- kr, kv

Technical support and logistics units

• Separate battalion, logistics company - omo, omo
• Automobile company, platoon, squad - avtr, avtv, auto
• Repair company- remr
• Economic platoon, department- household, household
• Supply platoon, supply platoon- vob, vsn
• Maintenance department- oto

Control points

• Command post- KP
• Rear control center - TPU
• Command observation post- KNP
• Reserve command post - ZKP
• Observation post- NP
• Air surveillance post- PVN
• Artillery observation post- ANP
• Technical supervision point - PTN
• Engineering observation post INP

General terminology

• Vanguard (rearguard) - Av (Ar)
• Bacteriological (biological) weapons - BO
• Bacteriological (biological) infection - BZ
• Battalion refueling point - BZP
• Fighting machine- BM
• Infantry fighting vehicle- BMP
• Combat reconnaissance vehicle- BRM
• Combat reconnaissance patrol vehicle- BRDM
• Side marching outpost- BPZ
• Armored personnel carrier- armored personnel carrier
• Combat kit- bk.
• Explosives- BB
• Height- high
• Head marching outpost- GPZ
• Head watch- GD
• Diesel fuel- DT
• Long-term fire structure (long-term fortification structure) - DOS (DFS)
• Incendiary weapons (incendiary weapons) - ZZhO (ZZhS)
• Refueling- lock
• Protection against weapons of mass destruction - ZOMP
• Zone of radioactive, chemical, bacteriological (biological) contamination - ZRZ, 3X3, ZBZ
• Anti-aircraft self-propelled gun - ZSU
• Starting line (starting point) - ref. r-zh, (ref.p.)
• Kiloton- CT
• Command and staff vehicle - KShM
• Set- set
• Commander of the 1st motorized rifle, 2nd tank battalion - KMSB-1, KTB-2
• Commander of the 1st motorized rifle, 2nd tank company - kmsr-1, ktr-2
• Commander of the 1st motorized rifle, 2nd tank platoon - kmsv-1, ktv-2
• Mine-explosive barrier- Cost center
• Regimental medical station MPP
• Battalion medical center MPB
• Company medical post MPR
• Emergency reserve - NZ
• Irreducible stock - NHS
• Firing position- OP
• Outskirts- env.
• Toxic substances (persistent toxic substances, unstable toxic substances) - 0V (COV, NOW)
• Mark- Elevation
• Separate- dept.
• Advance detachment- BY
• Mobile barrage detachment - POS
• Field refueling point - PZP
• Consecutive concentration of fire - PSO
• Enemy- pr-k
• Air defense (anti-tank defense) - Air defense (PTO)
• Anti-personnel minefield PPMP
• Anti-tank minefield PTMP
• Anti-tank reserve- PTRez.
• Radioactive contamination- RZ
• Radioactive substances- RV
• Radiation and chemical reconnaissance - RHR
• Reconnaissance squad- RO
• Dividing line- boundary line
• Radio network (radio direction) - r/s (r/n)
• District- district
• Repair and evacuation group (repair group) - REG (Rem. G)
• Regulation boundary (regulation point) - r-j per. (p. per.)
• Collection point for damaged vehicles - SPPM
• Sentry detachment (outpost, outpost) - Art.O (Art.Z, Art.P)
• North, south, east, west - north, south, east, west
• North-west, north-east, west, south-east south-west- north-west, north-east, south-east, south-west
• Focused Fire - CO
• Daily dacha- s/d
• Tactical airborne assault Tact. VD
• Tank bridge layer - MTU
• Rear marching outpost - TPZ
• Communication center- mustache
• Fortified area- UR
• Chemical observation post HNP
• Chemical contamination- HZ
• Chemical weapons- XO
• Chemical land mine HF
• Nuclear weapons- nuclear weapons
• Nuclear mine-
• YAM Nuclear minefield- YaMZ

Selected local items

	Plants, factories and mills with pipes, expressed (1) or not expressed (2) on the map scale
Capital structures of tower type	Light towers	Power plants
Transformer booths	Points of the state geodetic network	Aerodromes and hydroaerodromes
Watermills and sawmills	Windmills	Wind turbines
Plants, factories and mills without pipes: 1) expressed on a map scale; 2) not expressed in map scale.	Radio stations and television centers	Radio and television masts
Fuel warehouses and gas tanks	Separate trees that have landmark value: 1) conifers; 2) deciduous	Individual groves with significant landmarks
Narrow forest strips and protective forest stands	Narrow strips of bushes and hedges	Individual bushes
Communication lines	Mounds, height in meters	Outlier rocks
Power lines on metal or reinforced concrete supports	Pits, depth in meters	Clusters of stones
Power lines on wooden poles	Meteorological stations	Separately lying stones, height in meters
Onshore oil pipelines and pumping stations	Open pit mining sites	peat mining
Underground oil pipelines	Churches	Monuments, monuments, mass graves
Stone, brick walls	Dams and artificial embankments	Foresters' houses

Roads

Three-track railways, semaphores and traffic lights, turning circles	Highway: 5 is the width of the covered part, 8 is the width of the entire road from ditch to ditch in meters, B is the coating material
Double track railways and stations	Improved dirt roads (8 is the width of the roadway in meters)
Single-track railways, sidings, platforms and stopping points	Dirt roads
Electrified railways: 1) three-track; 2) double-track; 3) single track	Field and forest roads
Narrow gauge railways and stations on them	Hiking trails
Highways, embankments	Fascine sections of roads, roads and rowing
Improved highways, cuts	Transfers: 1) under the railway; 2) over the railway; 3) on the same level

Hydrography

Small rivers and streams	The banks are steep: 1) without a beach; 2) with a beach that does not end on the map scale
Channels and ditches	Lakes: 1) fresh; 2) salty; 3) bitter-salty
Wooden bridges Metal bridges Stone and reinforced concrete bridges	Characteristics of bridges: K-material of construction (K-stone, M-metal, reinforced concrete-reinforced concrete, D-wooden); 8-height above water level (on navigable rivers); 370-bridge length, 10 is the width of the roadway in meters; 60-ton capacity
Water edge marks Arrows showing the direction of river flow (0.2 - flow speed in m/sec.)	Characteristics of rivers and canals: 170-width, 1.7-depth in meters, P-character of the bottom soil Marinas Fords: 1.2-depth, 180-length in meters, T-character of the soil, 0.5-current speed in m/sec.
Dams: K-material of the structure, 250-length, 8-width of the dam at the top in meters; in the numerator - the mark of the upper water level, in the denominator - the lower	Gateways Ferries: 195-river width, 4x3-ferry dimensions in meters, 8-carrying capacity in meters
Ground water pipelines	Wells
Underground water pipelines	Sources (keys, springs)

System of basic symbols used in graphic documents of peacetime and wartime at the tactical level Part 4 “Motorized Rifle Battalion” -

The procedure for creating a combat graphic document. Fire card of a motorized rifle squad when planning offensive actions. Situation conditions: COMBAT ACTIVITY. Type of combat operations - OFFENSIVE -

CONVENTIONAL SIGNS FOR TOPOGRAPHIC PLANS -

In general, when hunting, you also need certain tactics similar to those that will be described in this article. And for hunting you don’t need to buy a firearm, you just need to take A pistol-type ballets and start hunting. Overall it is more convenient and enjoyable. Also, this kind of crossbow can be used for ordinary sporting purposes - target shooting.

Life around us is full of all kinds of signs and signals, we encounter them every day in various public places: on the streets, in transport, shopping centers, hospitals...
These signs and messages are often encrypted information, the true meaning of which only an initiate knows. So who are these secret messages addressed to and what are they for? BBC Future correspondent tried to find out.

"Inspector Sands, please report to the control room."- if on railway station In the UK you will ever hear such an announcement, don't be alarmed.
Even if from now on you will know that this is a coded message designed to notify the staff that an emergency has arisen in the station building.
In this case, encryption is necessary in order to let professionals who can help solve it know about the problem without causing panic among passengers.
The topic of cryptology within workshops and other communities was recently raised by users of the social news site Reddit, and during the ensuing discussion, thousands of examples were given.

Not all secret ciphers consist of letters and numbers. Some are pictograms that are not easy for the uninitiated to notice

But what ciphers and codes really exist, and what kind of information is hidden from the public during emergencies and other unusual situations?
Let's start with hospitals. There, color codes are commonly used as an alert to employees.
A Canadian hospital recently published its list of internal use symbols online. According to this list, red means fire; white reports aggression; black - about the threat of explosion.
In addition, medical staff everywhere use euphemisms. It is said that in hospitals, doctors sometimes call the morgue the “pink house” - out of respect for the feelings of the relatives of the patient who has just died.
Sea vessels have their own coding. For example, to notify the crew of a ship about emergency incidents, an announcement is usually made over the loudspeaker, beginning with the words “Mr. Skylight” (a proper name derived from the English word “skylight”, or “skylight” - translator’s note).
On the ferry Estonia, when it was in distress on its way from Tallinn to Stockholm in the fall of 1994, the following was announced over the loudspeaker: "Mr. Skylight, [you are expected] on the first and second".

The ferry Estonia sank in the Baltic Sea on September 28, 1994; just before the disaster on the ship, a message was heard for a certain Mr. Skylight

This coded phrase was supposed to serve as a signal to action - the crew was ordered to urgently batten down the hatches to restore the tightness in the hull compartments on the first and second decks.
However, the ship could not be saved, and of the 989 people on board, 852 died.
“As I understand it, there are quite good reasons for such messages to be encrypted,” says Paul Baker, a linguist at Lancaster University in the UK. “At the time the message is transmitted, there is often no clarity as to how the situation will develop. And There’s absolutely no point in disturbing people unnecessarily.”
However, not only various institutions and services are encrypted, but also all kinds of communities. This is evidenced, in particular, by numerous real-life examples given by discussion participants on the Reddit website.
Someone talked about store employees who came up with all sorts of special expressions for secret communication that only they could understand.
In several cases, "PEBKAC" was mentioned, a derogatory English term used by computer geeks to refer to certain unfortunate users who constantly report another system error. And the problem, according to IT specialists, is the ineptitude of these very users.
The abbreviation PEBKAC (or "Problem Exists Between Keyboard and Chair") just means that "There is a Problem Between the Keyboard and the Chair" (PIMKIC).
There are examples of jargon hidden from the average person in other professional communities.
Thus, BBC Trending reports on a secret expression used by researchers to exchange free articles from scientific journals, the content of which is available only by subscription.

Composed of rings, the "Eurion Constellation" appears on various currencies; this is what it looks like on a ten pound note

The formula “I can haz PDF” (in the spirit of the popular Internet meme “I can haz cheezburger”) is a hashtag with which any representative of the scientific community can now send tweets to colleagues, indicating the article he or she needs at the moment and the contact email address mail.
Those dedicated colleagues who have access to the sought-after material receive the signal and share.
But people looking for a partner through dating sites use a special digital code (437737) if they want to covertly warn a potential partner about their infection.
On a telephone dial, where numbers correspond to letters, this number corresponds to the word “herpes” in its English spelling (“herpes”); However, this also includes all other sexually transmitted diseases.

Cryptography in pictures

However, not all codes consist of letters and numbers. Some are pictograms that, although they seem to be in plain sight, should not be noticeable to the uninitiated.
A BBC Future article last year revealed that many banknotes feature what is known as the "Eurion constellation" in their designs. This graphic mark, recognized by most duplicating machines, helps protect paper money from being copied.
We can find many hidden pictographic symbols on the street. Interesting example- the so-called hoboglyphs.

These inconspicuous graffiti tags, called hoboglyphs, are designed to target homeless people and point out safe areas, water sources, police information, and more.

This is a system of signs intended for people traveling in search of work and homeless vagabonds.
Among other things, hoboglyphs can indicate the quality of water in a nearby source or warn about the inhospitability of the owners of a house along the way.
They say that gangs of graffiti writers also each develop their own closed system of symbols and cover the drawings of hostile groups with them.
Discover magazine provides several examples in its 2012 issues. Here are just a couple: "SS" stands for "South Side", a faction within the famous graffiti gang of Indianapolis, in the USA; the letter "X", carelessly painted in red paint over other people's graffiti, is a symbol of disrespect.
According to Discover, the special software Helps police decipher secret graffiti automatically. Such programs are already available even as smartphone applications.
And on city sidewalks around the world you can find squiggles written with spray paint that correspond to the system of symbols of builders and engineers.
Recently, an article on the BBC website revealed the meaning of several of these symbols used in the UK.
Different colors correspond to different types of cable or pipes. Blue indicates the water supply system; yellow refers to gas pipes, and green refers to outdoor video cameras or data cables.
Secret coding of information in public places is, of course, used for a reason.

According to the sign system adopted in the construction industry, red means electricity; blue - water; green - video cameras or cable networks; white - telecommunication networks

It helps to maintain public order during an emergency, quickly and clearly provide specialists with the necessary technical information, and in a sensitive manner warn representatives of certain social groups about a danger or opportunity.
However, after you learn about the existence of all these encryptions, it is difficult to get rid of the feeling that everything around has a conspiracy theological origin.
Even if we are talking about the transfer of purely practical, everyday information, some kind of conspiracy theory will inevitably come to mind.
It is therefore not surprising that this topic is one of the favorites on social networks.
“People don’t like secrets, right?” says Baker. “The [main] current trend is the maximum possible disclosure of data. It’s not for nothing that we live in the information age.”